http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3344&article_id=2369792
THE U.S. FACTOR IN ISRAEL'S MILITARY RELATIONS WITH CHINA
By Yitzhak ****chor
The Jerusalem-Beijing-Wa****ngton imbroglio over Israel's sale of Harpy
UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) to China that surfaced in December 2004
is by no means over. Yet, while it is too soon to mourn the untimely
death of Israeli arms sales to China, it is nonetheless becoming clear
to all parties concerned that these controversial military transfers
seem to have reached a dead end and have practically been suspended.
Even if the deal goes through (an unlikely possibility), Israel will
probably not resume its arms supplies to China in the foreseeable future
– though not because of mutual unwillingness. On the contrary, the two
parties are eager to continue their relation****p. But it is Wa****ngton
that for the last fifteen years has gradually forced Israel first to
limit and then to stop altogether its military transfers to China. This
staged pressure reached its climax with the killing of the Phalcon AWACS
deal five years ago. However, it has apparently failed to deliver the
message. Using the Harpy as an aftershock, the U.S. seems to be
promoting an uncompromising policy prohibiting all transfers to China of
goods, services and technology – military and civilian – produced by
Israel's defense industries. This policy effectively squelches
Sino-Israeli military relations.
Produced by Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Harpy is a 500 km-range
delta-wing lethal UAV with a day and night capability designed to
detect, attack and destroy radar emitters with a very high hit accuracy.
Launched from a ground vehicle behind the battle zone, Harpy is an
all-weather autonomous weapon system that can effectively suppress
hostile SAM (surface-to-air-missile) and radar sites for a long
duration. Like the Phalcon, Harpy does not incor****ate U.S. technology.
Indeed, when the Sino-Israeli Harpy UAV deal, negotiated in the
mid-1990s, was re****ted to the U.S., Wa****ngton – while upset by the
deal – did not explicitly object. By 1999, Israel had re****tedly sold
China about one hundred Harpy UAVs for about $55-70 million. Unlike the
aborted Phalcon deal (valued at $250 million-$1 billion), the Harpy deal
is relatively small given Israel's total arms sales of about $15 billion
in 2000-2004.
The deal was not exposed until 2002. In July, the Wa****ngton Times
re****ted that several Harpy drones had been spotted during a PLA
military exercise in southern Fujian province, opposite Taiwan. There
was no mention of any U.S. objection to the deal but earlier U.S.
accusations against Israeli arms sales to China were immediately
recycled and later integrated into the 2004 Re****t to Congress of the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission published in June.
According to Israel's Defense Ministry, its accusations were based on
"erroneous information." Sources in the Israeli Embassy in Wa****ngton
claimed that Israel does not require a license to ex****t Israeli
technologies and that the U.S. is perfectly aware that Israel's ex****t
control is among the best in the world, and all the U.S. technologies in
its possession are well protected. Furthermore, the sources underlined
that Israel acceded to a U.S. request by suspending all negotiations to
ex****t weapons and military equipment to China in January 2003.
In 2003, Israel agreed to a Chinese request to renew its Harpy
"spare-part inventory" and duly informed Wa****ngton. Harpy components
probably arrived in Israel in August 2004. Wa****ngton, which had
grudgingly agreed to the deal in the first place, could hardly oppose
China's request. Provisions of overhaul, maintenance, spare parts and
training are usually and legally covered by after-sale services of any
transaction, military or civilian. Yet, by December 2004 Wa****ngton had
come to believe that Harpy components were returned to Israel not for
"spare part replacement and routine overhaul" but for upgrading. This
upgrading may have included advanced technologies and sensors that could
detect radar emitters even after they are switched off. Developed after
the Harpy had been sold to China, these technologies have been
incor****ated in a new Harpy model, re****tedly sold to Taiwan. Moreover,
the Pentagon must have been concerned that joint U.S.-Israeli
technological achievements related to an even more advanced model, would
be leaked to the Chinese.
The Pentagon's surprise and consequent accusation against Israel for
misleading the U.S. and for withholding information, therefore, came as
a result of the upgrading, not the original sale. The upgrading was
considered a threat to Taiwan (and the Seventh Fleet), representing a
separate deal that has never been authorized. As such, it should have
been re****ted to, and approved by, the U.S. – according to
understandings reached with Israel in 2000, following the Phalcon
controversy, and certainly in view of Israel's January 2003 decision to
suspend all military ex****t contacts with China and to assure Wa****ngton
that it would not sell any item to China that could harm U.S. security.
While Israel regarded the Harpy upgrading as an integral part of the
earlier deal, reached before these understandings were agreed on,
Wa****ngton insisted that Israel should not only stop the upgrading
process but, furthermore, confiscate Chinese-owned UAV components.
The short-term outcome of this dispute is not yet clear, but the
long-term implications are already evident. In this triangular
relation****p, Wa****ngton represents the independent variable whose
uncompromising policy toward China is being systematically consolidated.
Trying to prevent a European breach of the arms embargo imposed on the
PRC after the Tiananmen 1989 confrontation, Wa****ngton can by no means
approve Israeli military sales to China. Moreover, because of its
overwhelming dependence on the U.S., Israel is a much easier prey
compared to Europe. Actually, six months before the Harpy crisis
erupted, the U.S. had re****tedly blocked the direct participation of
Israeli defense firms in security tenders for the 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games. This fits into Wa****ngton's policy of containing Beijing,
especially in view of the U.S. perception of the dangerous combination
of China's accelerated military modernization, increased political
authoritarianism and continued violation of human rights.
Indeed, China represents a dependent variable in this triangular
relation****p, apparently with little room to maneuver. State Counselor
and Deputy Prime Minister Tang Jiaxuan who arrived in Israel heading a
large delegation on December 25, 2004, soon after the crisis erupted,
warned the U.S. against meddling in Beijing's affairs. However, his
reaction was rather tempered and he hardly touched on the Harpy issue in
public. In fact, official China has been remarkably quiet and restrained
on the Harpy issue – unlike its response to the Phalcon affair that
immediately and seriously affected Israel's military, diplomatic and
economic activities in China. For one reason, upgrading the Harpy UAVs
is a relatively small deal and China already keeps most if not all of
the drones. It is only a question of time until the Chinese develop
their own version of sophisticated lethal UAVs, if they have not
already. The Israeli-made UAVs and most other arms acquisitions from
abroad (with the possible exception of Russia – but including Europe)
are primarily a quick fix. Also, unlike the Harpy affair, the Phalcon
affair involved a public loss of face for former president Jiang Zemin
who was personally promised to get the Phalcon. But the most im****tant
reason is China's ultimate realization that Israel has no choice.
Lu Jing, the political affairs counselor at the PRC Embassy in Tel Aviv,
told The Jerusalem Post on February 3, 2005 that Beijing's more
forgiving and understanding response to the Harpy affair is the outcome
of a learning process. "We have realized that what happened with the
[Phalcon] plane is not only the fault of the Israeli government … There
were some external factors involved as well. We have to look forward,
not backward. This relation****p is mutually beneficial for both
countries." Now, he added, we attempt "to put ourselves in your boots.
We were more tolerant this time around … We never scolded the Israeli
side. We just wanted to let the issue resolve quietly and not let it
damage the bilateral ties. I can't say we are satisfied, but while last
time we publicly expressed our outrage, this time we kept everything in.
We learned a lesson and didn't want to turn it into a big issue. This is
only one aspect of our relation****p." Numerous Chinese Internet comments
have been less understanding and displayed strong anti-American
sentiments, disbelief in Israel's dependence on the U.S. and even
criticism of Chinese officials' shortsightedness. One comment said: "A
small brother is a small brother. He should obey his big brother in
everything. One day, when Israel needs Chinese help, we shall firmly say
‘no'!" Indeed, unofficial Chinese sources said that if the UAVs were not
upgraded according to earlier Sino-Israeli agreements, China would apply
sanctions against Israeli companies both in China and in Hong Kong.
Finally, Israel is an even more dependent variable in this triangular
relation****p. For all of its irritation about Wa****ngton's behavior,
from now on it would be very difficult – if not impossible – for Israel
to sell China any kind of arms or technology of defense industrial
origin. Last March, before leaving on a visit to the U.S., Israel's
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz warned CEOs of some fifty of Israel's
leading defense firms that they need written permission for any business
negotiations with China or even for visiting China. After meeting U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Mofaz admitted that the Harpy
upgrade deal with China might be abandoned under U.S. pressure. Also,
earlier in the year Japan's Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura asked
the Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom to end arms sales to East
Asia. He meant China.
The inevitable outcome of the Harpy crisis will be an end to Israeli
arms sales to the PRC. Negotiations concerning the upgrade deal could
drag on for several months but ultimately, barring a reversal of events
and a dramatic change in Wa****ngton's strategic thinking about Beijing,
the China market is lost for Israel's defense industries for the
foreseeable future.
Yitzhak ****chor is Professor of East Asian Studies and Political Science
at the University of Haifa, and Senior Fellow, the Harry S Truman
Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, Israel.
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