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The Neoconservative Convergence
Some once famously dissenting ideas now govern U.S. foreign policy, =
maturing as they go.
BY CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
Thursday, July 21, 2005 12:01 a.m.
The post-Cold War era has seen a remarkable ideological experiment: Over =
the past 15 years, each of the three major American schools of foreign =
policy--realism, liberal internationalism and neoconservatism--has taken =
its turn at running things. (A fourth school, isolationism, has a long =
pedigree, but has yet to recover from Pearl Harbor and probably never =
will; it remains a minor source of dissidence with no chance of becoming =
a governing ideology.) There is much to be learned from this unusual and =
unplanned experiment.=20
The era began with the senior George Bush and a classically realist =
approach. This was Kissingerism without Kissinger--although Brent =
Scowcroft, James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger filled in admirably. The =
very phrase the administration coined to describe its vision--the New =
World Order--captured the core idea: an orderly world with orderly =
rulers living in stable equilibrium.=20
The elder Mr. Bush had two enormous achievements to his credit: the =
peaceful reunification of Germany, still historically undervalued, and =
the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, which maintained the status =
quo in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, his administration suffered from =
the classic shortcoming of realism: a failure of imagination. Mr. Bush =
brilliantly managed the reconstitution of Germany and the restoration of =
the independence of the East European states, but he could not see far =
enough to the liberation of the Soviet peoples themselves. His notorious =
"chicken Kiev" speech of 1991, warning Ukrainians against "suicidal =
nationalism," seemed to prefer Soviet stability to the risk of 15 free =
and independent states.=20
But we must not be retrospectively too severe. Democracy in Ukraine was =
hard to envision even a few years ago, let alone in the early 1990s, and =
Mr. Bush's hesitancy did not stop the march of liberation in the Soviet =
sphere. It was the failure of imagination in Mr. Bush's other area of =
triumph--Iraq--that had truly stark, even tragic, consequences.=20
Leaving Saddam in place, and declining to sup****t the Kurdish and ****ite =
uprisings that followed the first Gulf War, begat more than a decade of =
Iraqi suffering, rancor among our war allies, diplomatic isolation for =
the U.S., and a crumbling regime of U.N. sanctions. All this led =
ultimately and inevitably to a second war that could have been fought =
far more easily--and with the enthusiastic sup****t of Iraq's ****ites, =
who to this day remain suspicious of our intentions--in 1991. One =
recalls with dismay that the first two of Osama bin Laden's announced =
justifications for his declaration of war on America were the =
garrisoning of the holy places (i.e., Saudi Arabia) by crusader (i.e., =
American) soldiers and the suffering of Iraqis under sanctions. Both =
were a direct result of the inconclusive end to the first Gulf War.=20
Still, the achievements of the elder Mr. Bush far outweigh the failures. =
The smooth and peaceful dissolution of the Soviet empire began, Saddam =
was stopped, and Arabia was saved. But then came the second, radically =
different experiment. For the balance of the 1990s, for reasons having =
nothing to do with foreign policy, realism was abruptly replaced by the =
classic liberal internationalism of the Clinton administration.=20
It is hard to be charitable in assessing the record. Liberal =
internationalism's one major achievement in those years--saving the =
Muslims in the Balkans and creating conditions for their possible =
peaceful integration into Europe--was achieved, ironically, in defiance =
of its own major principle. It lacked what liberal internationalists =
incessantly claim is the sine qua non of legitimacy: the approval of the =
U.N. Security Council.=20
Otherwise, the period between 1993 and 2001 was a waste, eight years of =
sleepwalking, of the absurd pursuit of one treaty more useless than the =
last, while the rising threat--Islamic terrorism--was treated as a =
problem of law enforcement. Perhaps the most symbolic moment occurred at =
the residence of the U.S. ambassador to France in October 2000, after =
Yasser Arafat had rejected Israel's peace offer at Camp David and =
instead launched his bloody second intifada. In Paris for another round =
of talks, Arafat abruptly broke off negotiations and was leaving the =
residence when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright ran after him, =
chasing him in her heels on the cobblestone courtyard to induce him, to =
cajole him, into signing yet another worthless piece of paper.=20
Leon Trotsky is said to have remarked of the New York intellectual =
Dwight Macdonald, "Everyone has a right to be stupid, but Comrade =
Macdonald abuses the privilege." During its 7 1/2-year Oslo folly, the =
Clinton administration abused the privilege consistently.=20
Then came another radical change. By a fluke or a miracle, depending on =
your point of view, because of the confusion of a few disoriented voters =
in Palm Beach, Fla., this has been the decade of neoconservatism. =
Bismarck once said that God looks after fools, drunkards, children and =
the United States of America. Given the 2000 presidential election, it =
is clear that he works in very mysterious ways.=20
In place of realism or liberal internationalism, the past 4 1/2 years =
have seen an unashamed assertion and deployment of American power, a =
resort to unilateralism when necessary, and a willingness to pre-empt =
threats before they emerge. Most im****tantly, the second Bush =
administration has explicitly declared the spread of freedom to be the =
central principle of American foreign policy. George W. Bush's second =
inaugural address in January was the most dramatic and expansive =
expression of this principle. A few weeks later, at the National Defense =
University, the president offered its most succinct formulation: "The =
defense of freedom requires the advance of freedom."=20
The remarkable fact that the Bush doctrine is, essentially, a synonym =
for neoconservative foreign policy marks neoconservatism's own =
transition from a position of dissidence, which it occupied during the =
first Bush administration and the Clinton years, to governance. =
Neoconservative foreign policy, one might say, has reached maturity. =
That is not only a ****tentous development, requiring some rethinking of =
principles and practice, but a rather unexpected one.=20
It is unexpected because, only a year ago, neoconservative foreign =
policy was being consigned to the ash heap of history. In the spring and =
summer of 2004, in the midst of increasing difficulties in Iraq, it was =
very widely believed that neoconservative policies had been run to the =
ground, that the administration that had purveyed them would soon be =
thrown out of office, and that internecine recriminations were about to =
begin over who lost the war on terror, the war in Iraq and indeed the =
reins of American foreign policy. One prominent columnist, speaking for =
the conventional wisdom of the moment, called the Bush project in Iraq =
"a childish fantasy." And this, from a friend of neoconservatism.=20
As for the liberals who had come on board the project of liberating =
Iraq, they took its perceived foundering as an op****tunity to engage in =
a mass jumping of ****p. Some justified their abandonment of the Bush =
doctrine on the grounds that it was they who had been betrayed--by an =
administration whose incompetence, mendacity, political op****tunism and =
various other crimes had ruined a policy that would already have been =
crowned with success if only they had been in charge of postwar Iraq, =
calibrating brilliantly precise troop levels, calculating to three =
decimal places the required degree of de-Baathification, and overseeing =
just about every other operational detail according to the dictates of =
their own tactical genius.=20
Other liberals donned the guise of realists, who by the summer of 2004 =
were back in fa****on. At the height of this new vogue, just before the =
November election, even John Kerry's advisers, noting that the =
liberal-internationalist critique of the war (namely, that it lacked =
international sup****t and legitimacy) was not exactly winning converts, =
settled instead on a "realist" line of attack. From then on, Iraq would =
be known as the "wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time," which, =
translated, meant that we should be chasing terrorists cave-to-cave in =
Afghanistan rather than pursuing an ideological crusade in the Middle =
East.=20
If you add to this mix the classical realists, from Brent Scowcroft to =
Dimitri Simes, who had opposed the entire project from the beginning and =
were now penning their I-told-you-so's, there seemed scarcely anyone =
left on board the neoconservative ****p. But the most interesting =
about-face was that of some professed neoconservatives themselves. Among =
these, the most prominent was Francis Fukuyama, whose lead article in =
the summer 2004 National Interest was a "realist" attack on the entire =
ideological underpinnings of the Iraq war and the liberationist idea. =
The article's very title, "The Neoconservative Moment," made the mocking =
suggestion, also very much in vogue, that neoconservative foreign policy =
was finished, that its moment had come and gone, that it had been done =
in by Iraq, by its own overweening arrogance, and by its blindness to =
the realist wisdom that failure in Iraq was, as Mr. Fukuyama put it, =
"predictable in advance."=20
As it happens, Mr. Fukuyama had neglected to make that prediction in =
advance; at the time of the war and during the months of debate =
preceding it, he had been silent. Moreover, from the perspective of =
today, even his retroactive prediction in summer 2004 of inevitable and =
catastrophic failure in Iraq appears doubtful, to say the least. Getting =
a retroactive prediction wrong is quite an achievement, but it tells you =
much about the intellectual climate just a year ago.=20
Today, there is no euphoria regarding the Iraq project, but sobriety has =
replaced panic. Things have changed, and what changed them was four =
elections: two in the West, and two in the Middle East. First came the =
re-election in Australia of John Howard, a firm ally of the =
administration. This presaged the re-election of George W. Bush, which =
reaffirmed to the world America's staying power, gave popular legitimacy =
to the Bush doctrine, and established a clear mandate to continue the =
democratic project. The refusal of the American people last November to =
turn out a president who, rejecting an "exit strategy," pledged instead =
to remain until Iraqi self-governance had been secured, was a seminal =
moment.=20
The other two elections took place in the areas of our exertion: first =
the Afghan elections, scandalously underplayed by the American media, =
then the Iraqi elections, impossible to underplay even by the American =
media. The latter were a historical hinge point. After a string of other =
im****tant steps in Iraq that had been confidently dismissed as =
impossible and certainly impossible to do on time--the writing of an =
interim constitution, the transfer of power to an interim Iraqi =
government--came the greatest impossibility of all: free elections as =
scheduled. The overwhelming popular turnout, in what was essentially a =
referendum on the insurgency and on the democratic idea, sent a =
clear-cut message. Those who had said that the Iraqis, like Arabs in =
general, had no particular interest in self-government were wrong--as =
were those who claimed that the insurgency was a nationalist, =
anti-imperialist and widely popular movement.=20
This is hardly to say that things have not remained difficult in Iraq. =
The insurgency is still raging. It has the capacity to kill, to instill =
fear, and perhaps ultimately to destabilize the elected government. What =
the election did do, however, was to confirm what was already suggested =
by the insurgency's clear lack of any political program, any political =
wing, any ideology, indeed even any pretense of competing for hearts and =
minds. The election exposed the insurgency as an alliance of Baathist =
nihilism and atavistic jihadism, neither of which has a large =
constituency in Iraq.=20
And that is hardly all. The elections newly empowered fully 80% of the =
Iraqi population--the Kurds and the ****ites--and created an indigenous =
representative leader****p with a life-and-death stake in defeating the =
insurgency. By giving that 80% the political and institutional means to =
build the necessary forces, the elections infinitely improved the =
chances that a stable, multiethnic, democratic Iraq can emerge, despite =
the current mayhem. As Fouad Ajami wrote in The Wall Street Journal on =
May 16, upon returning from a visit to the region:=20
The insurgents will do what they are good at. But no one really believes =
that those dispensers of death can turn back the clock. . . . By a twist =
of fate, the one Arab country that had seemed ever marked for brutality =
and sorrow now stands poised on the frontier of a new political world.
The elections' effect on the wider Arab world was likewise both =
immediate and profound. Millions of Arabs watched on television as =
Iraqis exercised their political rights, and were moved to ask the =
obvious question: Why are Iraqis the only Arabs voting in free =
elections--and doing so, moreover, under American aegis and protection? =
The rest is so well known as barely to merit repeating. The Beirut =
spring. Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. Open demonstrations and the =
beginnings of political competition in Egypt. Women's suffrage in =
Kuwait. Small but significant steps toward democratization in the gulf. =
Bashar Assad's declared intent to legalize political parties in Syria, =
purge the ruling Baath party, sponsor free municipal elections in 2007, =
and move toward a market economy. (Not that Assad is likely to do any of =
this, but the fact that he must pretend to be doing it shows the =
astoni****ng reach of the Bush doctrine to date.)=20
Mr. Ajami has called this (in the title of a recent article in Foreign =
Affairs) the "Autumn of the Autocrats." Not the winter--nothing is =
certain, and we know of many democratizing movements in the past that =
were successfully put down. There are too many entrenched dictator****ps =
and kleptocracies in the region to declare anything won. What we can =
declare, with certainty, is the falsity of those confident assurances =
before the Iraq war, during the Iraq war and after the Iraq war that =
this project was inevitably doomed to failure because we do not know how =
to "do" democracy, and they do not know how to receive it.=20
In Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere in the Arab world, the forces of =
democratic liberalization have emerged on the political stage in a way =
that was unimaginable just two years ago. They have been energized and =
emboldened by the Iraqi example and by American resolve. Until now, it =
was widely assumed that the only alternative to pan-Arabist autocracy, =
to the Nassers and the Saddams, was Islamism. We now know, from Iraq and =
Lebanon, that there is another possibility, and that America has given =
it life. As the Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, hardly a noted =
friend of the Bush doctrine, put it in late February in an interview =
with David Ignatius of the Wa****ngton Post:=20
It's strange for me to say it, but this process of change has started =
because of the American invasion of Iraq. I was cynical about Iraq. But =
when I saw the Iraqi people voting three weeks ago, eight million of =
them, it was the start of a new Arab world. The Syrian people, the =
Egyptian people, all say that something is changing. The Berlin Wall has =
fallen. We can see it.
The Iraqi elections vindicated the two central propositions of the Bush =
doctrine. First, that the desire for freedom is indeed universal and not =
the private preserve of Westerners. Second, that America is genuinely =
committed to democracy in and of itself. Contrary to the cynics, whether =
Arab, European or American, the U.S. did not go into Iraq for oil or =
hegemony but for liberation--a truth that on Jan. 30 even al-Jazeera had =
to televise. Arabs in particular had had sound historical reason to =
doubt American sincerity: six decades of U.S. sup****t for Arab =
dictators, a cynical "realism" that began with FDR's deal with the House =
of Saud and reached its apogee with the 1991 betrayal of the anti-Saddam =
uprising that the elder Bush had encouraged in Iraq. Today, however, =
they see a different Bush and a different doctrine.=20
The Iraqi elections had one final effect. They so acutely embarrassed =
foreign critics, especially in Europe, that we began to see a rash of =
headlines asking the rhetorical question: Was Bush Right? The answer to =
that is: Yes, so far. The democratic project has been launched, against =
the critics and against the odds. That in itself is an immense =
historical achievement. But success will require maturation--a =
neoconservatism of discrimination and restraint, prepared to examine =
both its principles and its practice in shaping a truly governing =
philosophy.=20
In a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute last year, I tried to =
draw a distinction between a more expansive and a more restrictive =
neoconservative foreign policy. I called the two types, respectively, =
democratic globalism and democratic realism.=20
The chief spokesman for democratic globalism is the president himself, =
and his second inaugural address is its ur-text. What is most =
breathtaking about it is not what most people found shocking--his =
announced goal of aboli****ng tyranny throughout the world. Granted, that =
is rather cosmic-sounding, but it is only an expression of direction and =
hope for, well, the end of time. What is most expansive is the pledge =
that America will stand with dissidents throughout the world, wherever =
they are.=20
This sort of talk immediately opens itself up to the accusation of =
disingenuousness and hypocrisy. After all, the United States retains =
cozy relations with autocracies of various stripes, most notably Egypt, =
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Russia. Besides, if we place ourselves on the =
side of all dissidents everywhere, must we not declare our solidarity =
not only with democrats but with Islamist dissidents sitting in =
Pakistani, Egyptian, Saudi and Russian jails?=20
But we do not act this way, and we need not. The question of alliances =
with dictators, of deals with the devil, can be approached openly, =
forthrightly and without any need for defensiveness. The principle is =
that we cannot democratize the world overnight and, therefore, if we are =
sincere about the democratic project, we must proceed sequentially. Nor, =
out of a false equivalence, need we abandon democratic reformers in =
these autocracies. On the contrary, we have a duty to sup****t them, even =
as we have a perfect moral right to distinguish between democrats on the =
one hand and totalitarians or jihadists on the other.=20
In the absence of omnipotence, one must deal with the lesser of two =
evils. That means postponing radically destabilizing actions in places =
where the sup****t of the current nondemocratic regime is needed against =
a larger existential threat to the free world. There is no need to =
apologize for that. In World War II we allied ourselves with Stalin =
against Hitler. (As Churchill said shortly after the German invasion of =
the U.S.S.R.: "If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favorable =
reference to the devil in the House of Commons.") This was a necessary =
alliance, and a tem****ary one: When we were done with Hitler, we turned =
our attention to Stalin and his successors.=20
During the subsequent war, the Cold War, we again made alliances with =
the devil, in the form of a variety of right-wing dictators, in order to =
fight the greater evil. Here, again, the partner****p was necessary and =
tem****ary. Our deals with right-wing dictator****ps were contingent upon =
their usefulness and upon the status of the ongoing struggle. Once again =
we were true to our word. Whenever we could, and particularly as we =
approached victory in the larger war, we dispensed with those alliances. =
Consider two cases of useful but tem****ary allies against communism: =
Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. We =
proved our bona fides in both of these cases when, as Moscow weakened =
and the existential threat to the free world receded, we worked to bring =
down both dictators. In 1986, we openly and decisively sup****ted the =
Aquino revolution that deposed and exiled Marcos, and later in the '80s =
we pressed very hard for free elections in Chile that Mr. Pinochet lost, =
paving the way for the return of democracy.=20
Alliances with dictator****ps were justified in the war against fascism =
and the Cold War, and they are justified now in the successor =
existential struggle, the war against Arab/Islamic radicalism. This is =
not just theory. It has practical implications. For nothing is more =
practical than the question: After Afghanistan, after Iraq, what?=20
The answer is, first Lebanon, then Syria. Lebanon is next because it is =
so obviously ready for democracy, having practiced a form of it for 30 =
years after decolonization. Its sophistication and political culture =
make it ripe for transformation, as the massive pro-democracy =
demonstrations have shown.=20
Then comes Syria, both because of its vulnerability--the Lebanon =
withdrawal has gravely weakened Assad--and because of its strategic =
im****tance. A critical island of recalcitrance in a liberalizing region =
stretching from the Mediterranean to the Iranian border, Syria has tried =
to destabilize all of its neighbors: Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and =
now, most obviously and bloodily, the new Iraq. Serious, prolonged, =
ruthless pressure on the Assad regime would yield enormous geopolitical =
advantage in democratizing, and thus pacifying, the entire Levant.=20
Some conservatives (and many liberals) have proposed instead that we be =
true to the universalist language of the president's second inaugural =
address and go after the three principal Islamic autocracies: Egypt, =
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Not so fast, and not so hard. Autocracies =
they are, and in many respects nasty ones. But doing this would be a =
mistake.=20
In Egypt, we certainly have liberal resources that should be sup****ted =
and encouraged. But, keeping in mind the Algerian experience, we should =
be wary of bringing down the whole house of cards and thereby derailing =
any progress from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. Saudi Arabia =
has a Byzantine culture, and an equally Byzantine method of governance, =
which must be delicately reformed short of overthrow. And Pakistan, =
which has great potential for democracy, is simply too critical as a =
military ally in the war on al Qaeda to risk anything right now. Pervez =
Musharraf is no bastard; but even if he were, he is ours. We should be =
encouraging the evolution of democracy in all of these countries, but =
relentless and ruthless means--of the kind we employed in Afghanistan =
and Iraq and should, perhaps short of direct military invention, be =
employing in Syria--are better applied to enemies, not friends.=20
What is interesting is that the Bush administration, in practice, is =
proceeding precisely along these lines. It pushes on Hosni Mubarak, but =
gently. It moves even more gingerly with Saudi Arabia, fearing what may =
emerge in the short term if the royal kleptocracy is deposed. And, =
because Pakistan is so central to the war on terror, it disturbs not a =
hair on the head of Mr. Musharraf.=20
In short, the Bush administration--if you like, neoconservatism in =
power--has been far more inclined to pursue democratic realism and to =
consign democratic globalism to the realm of aspiration. This kind of =
prudent circumspection is, in fact, a practical necessity for governing =
in the real world. We should, for example, be doing everything in our =
power, both overtly and covertly, to encourage a democratic revolution =
in Iran, a deeply hostile and dangerous state, even while trying =
carefully to manage democratic evolution in places like Egypt, Saudi =
Arabia and Pakistan. Indeed, the behavior of the Bush administration =
implies that in practice, the distinction between democratic realism and =
democratic globalism may collapse, because globalism is simply not =
sustainable.=20
Another im****tant sign of the maturing of neoconservative foreign policy =
is that it is no longer tethered to its own ideological history and =
paternity. The current practitioners of neoconservative foreign policy =
are George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld. =
They have no history in the movement, and before 9/11 had little =
affinity to or affiliation with it.=20
The fathers of neoconservatism are former liberals or leftists. Today, =
its chief proponents, to judge by their history, are former realists. =
Ms. Rice, for example, was a disciple of Brent Scowcroft; Mr. Cheney =
served as secretary of defense in the first Bush administration. =
September 11 changed all of that. It changed the world, and changed our =
understanding of the world. As neoconservatism seemed to offer the most =
plausible explanation of the new reality and the most compelling and =
active response to it, many realists were brought to acknowledge the =
poverty of realism--not just the futility but the danger of a foreign =
policy centered on the illusion of stability and equilibrium. These =
realists, newly mugged by reality, have given weight to neoconservatism, =
making it more diverse and, given the newcomers' past experience, more =
mature.=20
What neoconservatives have long been advocating is now being articulated =
and practiced at the highest levels of government by a war cabinet =
composed of individuals who, coming from a very different place, have =
joined and reshaped the neoconservative camp and are carrying the =
neoconservative idea throughout the world. As a result, the vast =
right-wing conspiracy has grown even more vast than liberals could =
imagine. And even as the tent has enlarged, the great schisms and splits =
in conservative foreign policy--so widely predicted just a year ago, so =
eagerly sought and amplified by outside analysts--have not occurred. =
Indeed, differences have, if anything, narrowed.=20
This is not party discipline. It is compromise with reality, and =
convergence toward the middle. Above all, it is the maturation of a =
governing ideology whose time has come.=20
Mr. Krauthammer is a nationally syndicated columnist for the Wa****ngton =
Post and an essayist for Time. He won a Pulitzer Prize in 1987, and in =
2003 was a recipient of the Bradley Prize. This essay, in somewhat =
different form, was delivered in New York City in May as Commentary's =
first annual Norman Podhoretz Lecture, and it appears in the July/August =
issue of Commentary.=20
Received From: jjjchao@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
=20
VISION RETROSPECTIVA DE LA EVOLUCION DEL MUNDO EN EL ULTIMO SIGLO
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Distributed by
Chachi Novellas Bengochea
Delray Beach, Florida, USA
FOR FREEDOM & JUSTICE GROUP
http://groupsyahoo.com/grop/ForFreedomandJustice/
"Live-Free-or-Die"
"One Nation UNDER GOD" "IN GOD WE TRUST"
--=20
http://therealcuba.com/Dennis.htm
http://therealcuba.com/Page24.htm
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<P><B><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#ff0000 size=3D5><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The=20
Neoconservative Convergence</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT face=3DArial><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
7.5pt"><BR></SPAN></FONT><FONT=20
face=3DArial><SPAN style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Some=20
once famously dissenting ideas now govern U.S. foreign policy, maturing =
as they=20
go.</SPAN></FONT><FONT face=3DArial><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
7.5pt"><BR><BR></SPAN></FONT><B><FONT=20
face=3DArial><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">BY=20
CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER</SPAN></FONT></B><FONT face=3DArial><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
7.5pt"><BR></SPAN></FONT><I><FONT=20
face=3DArial><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-STYLE: italic; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Thursday,=20
July 21, 2005 12:01 a.m.</SPAN></FONT></I><FONT face=3DArial><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
7.5pt"><BR><BR></SPAN></FONT><FONT=20
face=3DArial><SPAN style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
post-Cold War era has seen a remarkable ideological experiment: Over the =
past 15=20
years, each of the three major American schools of foreign =
policy--realism,=20
liberal internationalism and neoconservatism--has taken its turn at =
running=20
things. (A fourth school, isolationism, has a long pedigree, but has yet =
to=20
recover from Pearl Harbor and probably never will; it remains a minor =
source of=20
dissidence with no chance of becoming a governing ideology.) There is =
much to be=20
learned from this unusual and unplanned experiment. <?xml:namespace =
prefix =3D o=20
ns =3D "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" =
/><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The era=20
began with the senior George Bush and a classically realist approach. =
This was=20
Kissingerism without Kissinger--although Brent Scowcroft, James Baker =
and=20
Lawrence Eagleburger filled in admirably. The very phrase the =
administration=20
coined to describe its vision--the New World Order--captured the core =
idea: an=20
orderly world with orderly rulers living in stable equilibrium.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
elder Mr. Bush had two enormous achievements to his credit: the peaceful =
reunification of Germany, still historically undervalued, and the =
expulsion of=20
Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, which maintained the status quo in the =
Persian Gulf.=20
Nonetheless, his administration suffered from the classic shortcoming of =
realism: a failure of imagination. Mr. Bush brilliantly managed the=20
reconstitution of Germany and the restoration of the independence of the =
East=20
European states, but he could not see far enough to the liberation of =
the Soviet=20
peoples themselves. His notorious "chicken Kiev" speech of 1991, warning =
Ukrainians against "suicidal nationalism," seemed to prefer Soviet =
stability to=20
the risk of 15 free and independent states. =
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">But we=20
must not be retrospectively too severe. Democracy in Ukraine was hard to =
envision even a few years ago, let alone in the early 1990s, and Mr. =
Bush's=20
hesitancy did not stop the march of liberation in the Soviet sphere. It =
was the=20
failure of imagination in Mr. Bush's other area of triumph--Iraq--that =
had truly=20
stark, even tragic, consequences. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Leaving=20
Saddam in place, and declining to sup****t the Kurdish and ****ite =
uprisings that=20
followed the first Gulf War, begat more than a decade of Iraqi =
suffering, rancor=20
among our war allies, diplomatic isolation for the U.S., and a crumbling =
regime=20
of U.N. sanctions. All this led ultimately and inevitably to a second =
war that=20
could have been fought far more easily--and with the enthusiastic =
sup****t of=20
Iraq's ****ites, who to this day remain suspicious of our intentions--in =
1991.=20
One recalls with dismay that the first two of Osama bin Laden's =
announced=20
justifications for his declaration of war on America were the =
garrisoning of the=20
holy places (i.e., Saudi Arabia) by crusader (i.e., American) soldiers =
and the=20
suffering of Iraqis under sanctions. Both were a direct result of the=20
inconclusive end to the first Gulf War. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Still,=20
the achievements of the elder Mr. Bush far outweigh the failures. The =
smooth and=20
peaceful dissolution of the Soviet empire began, Saddam was stopped, and =
Arabia=20
was saved. But then came the second, radically different experiment. For =
the=20
balance of the 1990s, for reasons having nothing to do with foreign =
policy,=20
realism was abruptly replaced by the classic liberal internationalism of =
the=20
Clinton administration. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">It is=20
hard to be charitable in assessing the record. Liberal =
internationalism's one=20
major achievement in those years--saving the Muslims in the Balkans and =
creating=20
conditions for their possible peaceful integration into Europe--was =
achieved,=20
ironically, in defiance of its own major principle. It lacked what =
liberal=20
internationalists incessantly claim is the sine qua non of legitimacy: =
the=20
approval of the U.N. Security Council. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Otherwise,=20
the period between 1993 and 2001 was a waste, eight years of =
sleepwalking, of=20
the absurd pursuit of one treaty more useless than the last, while the =
rising=20
threat--Islamic terrorism--was treated as a problem of law enforcement. =
Perhaps=20
the most symbolic moment occurred at the residence of the U.S. =
ambassador to=20
France in October 2000, after Yasser Arafat had rejected Israel's peace =
offer at=20
Camp David and instead launched his bloody second <I><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-STYLE: italic">intifada.</SPAN></I> In Paris for another =
round of=20
talks, Arafat abruptly broke off negotiations and was leaving the =
residence when=20
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright ran after him, chasing him in her =
heels on=20
the cobblestone courtyard to induce him, to cajole him, into signing yet =
another=20
worthless piece of paper. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Leon=20
Trotsky is said to have remarked of the New York intellectual Dwight =
Macdonald,=20
"Everyone has a right to be stupid, but Comrade Macdonald abuses the =
privilege."=20
During its 7 1/2-year Oslo folly, the Clinton administration abused =
the=20
privilege consistently. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt"><IMG=20
id=3D_x0000_i1025 height=3D6 =
src=3D"cid:028701c58fd0$7ba752e0$6101a8c0@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"=20
width=3D88 align=3Dcenter border=3D0><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Then=20
came another radical change. By a fluke or a miracle, depending on your =
point of=20
view, because of the confusion of a few disoriented voters in Palm =
Beach, Fla.,=20
this has been the decade of neoconservatism. Bismarck once said that God =
looks=20
after fools, drunkards, children and the United States of America. Given =
the=20
2000 presidential election, it is clear that he works in very mysterious =
ways.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">In place=20
of realism or liberal internationalism, the past 4 1/2 years have =
seen an=20
unashamed assertion and deployment of American power, a resort to =
unilateralism=20
when necessary, and a willingness to pre-empt threats before they =
emerge. Most=20
im****tantly, the second Bush administration has explicitly declared the =
spread=20
of freedom to be the central principle of American foreign policy. =
George W.=20
Bush's second inaugural address in January was the most dramatic and =
expansive=20
expression of this principle. A few weeks later, at the National Defense =
University, the president offered its most succinct formulation: "The =
defense of=20
freedom requires the advance of freedom." <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
remarkable fact that the Bush doctrine is, essentially, a synonym for=20
neoconservative foreign policy marks neoconservatism's own transition =
from a=20
position of dissidence, which it occupied during the first Bush =
administration=20
and the Clinton years, to governance. Neoconservative foreign policy, =
one might=20
say, has reached maturity. That is not only a ****tentous development, =
requiring=20
some rethinking of principles and practice, but a rather unexpected one. =
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">It is=20
unexpected because, only a year ago, neoconservative foreign policy was =
being=20
consigned to the ash heap of history. In the spring and summer of 2004, =
in the=20
midst of increasing difficulties in Iraq, it was very widely believed =
that=20
neoconservative policies had been run to the ground, that the =
administration=20
that had purveyed them would soon be thrown out of office, and that =
internecine=20
recriminations were about to begin over who lost the war on terror, the =
war in=20
Iraq and indeed the reins of American foreign policy. One prominent =
columnist,=20
speaking for the conventional wisdom of the moment, called the Bush =
project in=20
Iraq "a childish fantasy." And this, from a friend of neoconservatism.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">As for=20
the liberals who had come on board the project of liberating Iraq, they =
took its=20
perceived foundering as an op****tunity to engage in a mass jumping of =
****p. Some=20
justified their abandonment of the Bush doctrine on the grounds that it =
was=20
<I><SPAN style=3D"FONT-STYLE: italic">they </SPAN></I>who had been =
betrayed--by an=20
administration whose incompetence, mendacity, political op****tunism and =
various=20
other crimes had ruined a policy that would already have been crowned =
with=20
success if only they had been in charge of postwar Iraq, calibrating =
brilliantly=20
precise troop levels, calculating to three decimal places the required =
degree of=20
de-Baathification, and overseeing just about every other operational =
detail=20
according to the dictates of their own tactical genius.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Other=20
liberals donned the guise of realists, who by the summer of 2004 were =
back in=20
fa****on. At the height of this new vogue, just before the November =
election,=20
even John Kerry's advisers, noting that the liberal-internationalist =
critique of=20
the war (namely, that it lacked international sup****t and legitimacy) =
was not=20
exactly winning converts, settled instead on a "realist" line of attack. =
From=20
then on, Iraq would be known as the "wrong war in the wrong place at the =
wrong=20
time," which, translated, meant that we should be chasing terrorists=20
cave-to-cave in Afghanistan rather than pursuing an ideological crusade =
in the=20
Middle East. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">If you=20
add to this mix the classical realists, from Brent Scowcroft to Dimitri =
Simes,=20
who had opposed the entire project from the beginning and were now =
penning their=20
I-told-you-so's, there seemed scarcely anyone left on board the =
neoconservative=20
****p. But the most interesting about-face was that of some professed=20
neoconservatives themselves. Among these, the most prominent was Francis =
Fukuyama, whose lead article in the summer 2004 National Interest was a=20
"realist" attack on the entire ideological underpinnings of the Iraq war =
and the=20
liberationist idea. The article's very title, "The Neoconservative =
Moment," made=20
the mocking suggestion, also very much in vogue, that neoconservative =
foreign=20
policy was finished, that its moment had come and gone, that it had been =
done in=20
by Iraq, by its own overweening arrogance, and by its blindness to the =
realist=20
wisdom that failure in Iraq was, as Mr. Fukuyama put it, "predictable in =
advance." <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">As it=20
happens, Mr. Fukuyama had neglected to make that prediction in advance; =
at the=20
time of the war and during the months of debate preceding it, he had =
been=20
silent. Moreover, from the perspective of today, even his retroactive =
prediction=20
in summer 2004 of inevitable and catastrophic failure in Iraq appears =
doubtful,=20
to say the least. Getting a retroactive prediction wrong is quite an=20
achievement, but it tells you much about the intellectual climate just a =
year=20
ago. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt"><IMG=20
id=3D_x0000_i1026 height=3D6 =
src=3D"cid:028701c58fd0$7ba752e0$6101a8c0@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"=20
width=3D88 align=3Dcenter border=3D0><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Today,=20
there is no euphoria regarding the Iraq project, but sobriety has =
replaced=20
panic. Things have changed, and what changed them was four elections: =
two in the=20
West, and two in the Middle East. First came the re-election in =
Australia of=20
John Howard, a firm ally of the administration. This presaged the =
re-election of=20
George W. Bush, which reaffirmed to the world America's staying power, =
gave=20
popular legitimacy to the Bush doctrine, and established a clear mandate =
to=20
continue the democratic project. The refusal of the American people last =
November to turn out a president who, rejecting an "exit strategy," =
pledged=20
instead to remain until Iraqi self-governance had been secured, was a =
seminal=20
moment. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
other two elections took place in the areas of our exertion: first the =
Afghan=20
elections, scandalously underplayed by the American media, then the =
Iraqi=20
elections, impossible to underplay even by the American media. The =
latter were a=20
historical hinge point. After a string of other im****tant steps in Iraq =
that had=20
been confidently dismissed as impossible and certainly impossible to do =
on=20
time--the writing of an interim constitution, the transfer of power to =
an=20
interim Iraqi government--came the greatest impossibility of all: free =
elections=20
as scheduled. The overwhelming popular turnout, in what was essentially =
a=20
referendum on the insurgency and on the democratic idea, sent a =
clear-cut=20
message. Those who had said that the Iraqis, like Arabs in general, had =
no=20
particular interest in self-government were wrong--as were those who =
claimed=20
that the insurgency was a nationalist, anti-imperialist and widely =
popular=20
movement. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">This is=20
hardly to say that things have not remained difficult in Iraq. The =
insurgency is=20
still raging. It has the capacity to kill, to instill fear, and perhaps=20
ultimately to destabilize the elected government. What the election did =
do,=20
however, was to confirm what was already suggested by the insurgency's =
clear=20
lack of any political program, any political wing, any ideology, indeed =
even any=20
pretense of competing for hearts and minds. The election exposed the =
insurgency=20
as an alliance of Baathist nihilism and atavistic jihadism, neither of =
which has=20
a large constituency in Iraq. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">And that=20
is hardly all. The elections newly empowered fully 80% of the Iraqi=20
population--the Kurds and the ****ites--and created an indigenous =
representative=20
leader****p with a life-and-death stake in defeating the insurgency. By =
giving=20
that 80% the political and institutional means to build the necessary =
forces,=20
the elections infinitely improved the chances that a stable, =
multiethnic,=20
democratic Iraq can emerge, despite the current mayhem. As Fouad Ajami =
wrote in=20
The Wall Street Journal on May 16, upon returning from a visit to the =
region:=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
insurgents will do what they are good at. But no one really believes =
that those=20
dispensers of death can turn back the clock. . . . By a twist =
of fate,=20
the one Arab country that had seemed ever marked for brutality and =
sorrow now=20
stands poised on the frontier of a new political=20
world.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
elections' effect on the wider Arab world was likewise both immediate =
and=20
profound. Millions of Arabs watched on television as Iraqis exercised =
their=20
political rights, and were moved to ask the obvious question: Why are =
Iraqis the=20
only Arabs voting in free elections--and doing so, moreover, under =
American=20
aegis and protection? The rest is so well known as barely to merit =
repeating.=20
The Beirut spring. Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. Open demonstrations =
and the=20
beginnings of political competition in Egypt. Women's suffrage in =
Kuwait. Small=20
but significant steps toward democratization in the gulf. Bashar Assad's =
declared intent to legalize political parties in Syria, purge the ruling =
Baath=20
party, sponsor free municipal elections in 2007, and move toward a =
market=20
economy. (Not that Assad is likely to do any of this, but the fact that =
he must=20
pretend to be doing it shows the astoni****ng reach of the Bush doctrine =
to=20
date.) <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Mr.=20
Ajami has called this (in the title of a recent article in Foreign =
Affairs) the=20
"Autumn of the Autocrats." Not the winter--nothing is certain, and we =
know of=20
many democratizing movements in the past that were successfully put =
down. There=20
are too many entrenched dictator****ps and kleptocracies in the region to =
declare=20
anything won. What we <I><SPAN style=3D"FONT-STYLE: italic">can=20
</SPAN></I>declare, with certainty, is the falsity of those confident =
assurances=20
before the Iraq war, during the Iraq war and after the Iraq war that =
this=20
project was inevitably doomed to failure because we do not know how to =
"do"=20
democracy, and they do not know how to receive it. =
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">In Iraq,=20
Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere in the Arab world, the forces of democratic =
liberalization have emerged on the political stage in a way that was=20
unimaginable just two years ago. They have been energized and emboldened =
by the=20
Iraqi example and by American resolve. Until now, it was widely assumed =
that the=20
only alternative to pan-Arabist autocracy, to the Nassers and the =
Saddams, was=20
Islamism. We now know, from Iraq and Lebanon, that there is another =
possibility,=20
and that America has given it life. As the Lebanese Druze leader Walid =
Jumblatt,=20
hardly a noted friend of the Bush doctrine, put it in late February in =
an=20
interview with David Ignatius of the Wa****ngton Post:=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">It's=20
strange for me to say it, but this process of change has started because =
of the=20
American invasion of Iraq. I was cynical about Iraq. But when I saw the =
Iraqi=20
people voting three weeks ago, eight million of them, it was the start =
of a new=20
Arab world. The Syrian people, the Egyptian people, all say that =
something is=20
changing. The Berlin Wall has fallen. We can see=20
it.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
Iraqi elections vindicated the two central propositions of the Bush =
doctrine.=20
First, that the desire for freedom is indeed universal and not the =
private=20
preserve of Westerners. Second, that America is genuinely committed to =
democracy=20
in and of itself. Contrary to the cynics, whether Arab, European or =
American,=20
the U.S. did not go into Iraq for oil or hegemony but for liberation--a =
truth=20
that on Jan. 30 even al-Jazeera had to televise. Arabs in =
particular had=20
had sound historical reason to doubt American sincerity: six decades of =
U.S.=20
sup****t for Arab dictators, a cynical "realism" that began with FDR's =
deal with=20
the House of Saud and reached its apogee with the 1991 betrayal of the=20
anti-Saddam uprising that the elder Bush had encouraged in Iraq. Today, =
however,=20
they see a different Bush and a different doctrine.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt"><IMG=20
id=3D_x0000_i1027 height=3D6 =
src=3D"cid:028701c58fd0$7ba752e0$6101a8c0@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"=20
width=3D88 align=3Dcenter border=3D0><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
Iraqi elections had one final effect. They so acutely embarrassed =
foreign=20
critics, especially in Europe, that we began to see a rash of headlines =
asking=20
the rhetorical question: Was Bush Right? The answer to that is: Yes, so =
far. The=20
democratic project has been launched, against the critics and against =
the odds.=20
That in itself is an immense historical achievement. But success will =
require=20
maturation--a neoconservatism of discrimination and restraint, prepared =
to=20
examine both its principles and its practice in shaping a truly =
governing=20
philosophy. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">In a=20
lecture at the <A=20
href=3D"http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19912,filter.all/pub_detail=
..asp"=20
target=3D_blank><FONT color=3D#000000>American Enterprise =
Institute</FONT></A> last=20
year, I tried to draw a distinction between a more expansive and a more=20
restrictive neoconservative foreign policy. I called the two types,=20
respectively, democratic globalism and democratic realism.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
chief spokesman for democratic globalism is the president himself, and =
his=20
second inaugural address is its ur-text. What is most breathtaking about =
it is=20
not what most people found shocking--his announced goal of aboli****ng =
tyranny=20
throughout the world. Granted, that is rather cosmic-sounding, but it is =
only an=20
expression of direction and hope for, well, the end of time. What is =
most=20
expansive is the pledge that America will stand with dissidents =
throughout the=20
world, wherever they are. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">This=20
sort of talk immediately opens itself up to the accusation of =
disingenuousness=20
and hypocrisy. After all, the United States retains cozy relations with=20
autocracies of various stripes, most notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, =
Pakistan and=20
Russia. Besides, if we place ourselves on the side of all dissidents =
everywhere,=20
must we not declare our solidarity not only with democrats but with =
Islamist=20
dissidents sitting in Pakistani, Egyptian, Saudi and Russian jails?=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">But we=20
do not act this way, and we need not. The question of alliances with =
dictators,=20
of deals with the devil, can be approached openly, forthrightly and =
without any=20
need for defensiveness. The principle is that we cannot democratize the =
world=20
overnight and, therefore, if we are sincere about the democratic =
project, we=20
must proceed sequentially. Nor, out of a false equivalence, need we =
abandon=20
democratic reformers in these autocracies. On the contrary, we have a =
duty to=20
sup****t them, even as we have a perfect moral right to distinguish =
between=20
democrats on the one hand and totalitarians or jihadists on the other.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">In the=20
absence of omnipotence, one must deal with the lesser of two evils. That =
means=20
postponing radically destabilizing actions in places where the sup****t =
of the=20
current nondemocratic regime is needed against a larger existential =
threat to=20
the free world. There is no need to apologize for that. In World War II =
we=20
allied ourselves with Stalin against Hitler. (As Churchill said shortly =
after=20
the German invasion of the U.S.S.R.: "If Hitler invaded hell I would =
make at=20
least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.") This =
was a=20
necessary alliance, and a tem****ary one: When we were done with Hitler, =
we=20
turned our attention to Stalin and his successors. =
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">During=20
the subsequent war, the Cold War, we again made alliances with the =
devil, in the=20
form of a variety of right-wing dictators, in order to fight the greater =
evil.=20
Here, again, the partner****p was necessary and tem****ary. Our deals with =
right-wing dictator****ps were contingent upon their usefulness and upon =
the=20
status of the ongoing struggle. Once again we were true to our word. =
Whenever we=20
could, and particularly as we approached victory in the larger war, we =
dispensed=20
with those alliances. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Consider=20
two cases of useful but tem****ary allies against communism: Augusto =
Pinochet in=20
Chile and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. We proved our bona fides =
in both=20
of these cases when, as Moscow weakened and the existential threat to =
the free=20
world receded, we worked to bring down both dictators. In 1986, we =
openly and=20
decisively sup****ted the Aquino revolution that deposed and exiled =
Marcos, and=20
later in the '80s we pressed very hard for free elections in Chile that =
Mr.=20
Pinochet lost, paving the way for the return of democracy.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt"><IMG=20
id=3D_x0000_i1028 height=3D6 =
src=3D"cid:028701c58fd0$7ba752e0$6101a8c0@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"=20
width=3D88 align=3Dcenter border=3D0><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Alliances=20
with dictator****ps were justified in the war against fascism and the =
Cold War,=20
and they are justified now in the successor existential struggle, the =
war=20
against Arab/Islamic radicalism. This is not just theory. It has =
practical=20
implications. For nothing is more practical than the question: After=20
Afghanistan, after Iraq, what? <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
answer is, first Lebanon, then Syria. Lebanon is next because it is so =
obviously=20
ready for democracy, having practiced a form of it for 30 years after=20
decolonization. Its sophistication and political culture make it ripe =
for=20
transformation, as the massive pro-democracy demonstrations have shown.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Then=20
comes Syria, both because of its vulnerability--the Lebanon withdrawal =
has=20
gravely weakened Assad--and because of its strategic im****tance. A =
critical=20
island of recalcitrance in a liberalizing region stretching from the=20
Mediterranean to the Iranian border, Syria has tried to destabilize all =
of its=20
neighbors: Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and now, most obviously and =
bloodily,=20
the new Iraq. Serious, prolonged, ruthless pressure on the Assad regime =
would=20
yield enormous geopolitical advantage in democratizing, and thus =
pacifying, the=20
entire Levant. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Some=20
conservatives (and many liberals) have proposed instead that we be true =
to the=20
universalist language of the president's second inaugural address and go =
after=20
the three principal Islamic autocracies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and =
Pakistan. Not=20
so fast, and not so hard. Autocracies they are, and in many respects =
nasty ones.=20
But doing this would be a mistake. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">In=20
Egypt, we certainly have liberal resources that should be sup****ted and=20
encouraged. But, keeping in mind the Algerian experience, we should be =
wary of=20
bringing down the whole house of cards and thereby derailing any =
progress from=20
authoritarianism to liberal democracy. Saudi Arabia has a Byzantine =
culture, and=20
an equally Byzantine method of governance, which must be delicately =
reformed=20
short of overthrow. And Pakistan, which has great potential for =
democracy, is=20
simply too critical as a military ally in the war on al Qaeda to risk =
anything=20
right now. Pervez Musharraf is no bastard; but even if he were, he is =
ours. We=20
should be encouraging the evolution of democracy in all of these =
countries, but=20
relentless and ruthless means--of the kind we employed in Afghanistan =
and Iraq=20
and should, perhaps short of direct military invention, be employing in=20
Syria--are better applied to enemies, not friends. =
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">What is=20
interesting is that the Bush administration, in practice, is proceeding=20
precisely along these lines. It pushes on Hosni Mubarak, but gently. It =
moves=20
even more gingerly with Saudi Arabia, fearing what may emerge in the =
short term=20
if the royal kleptocracy is deposed. And, because Pakistan is so central =
to the=20
war on terror, it disturbs not a hair on the head of Mr. Musharraf.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">In=20
short, the Bush administration--if you like, neoconservatism in =
power--has been=20
far more inclined to pursue democratic realism and to consign democratic =
globalism to the realm of aspiration. This kind of prudent =
circumspection is, in=20
fact, a practical necessity for governing in the real world. We should, =
for=20
example, be doing everything in our power, both overtly and covertly, to =
encourage a democratic revolution in Iran, a deeply hostile and =
dangerous state,=20
even while trying carefully to manage democratic evolution in places =
like Egypt,=20
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Indeed, the behavior of the Bush =
administration=20
implies that in practice, the distinction between democratic realism and =
democratic globalism may collapse, because globalism is simply not =
sustainable.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt"><IMG=20
id=3D_x0000_i1029 height=3D6 =
src=3D"cid:028701c58fd0$7ba752e0$6101a8c0@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"=20
width=3D88 align=3Dcenter border=3D0><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">Another=20
im****tant sign of the maturing of neoconservative foreign policy is that =
it is=20
no longer tethered to its own ideological history and paternity. The =
current=20
practitioners of neoconservative foreign policy are George W. Bush, Dick =
Cheney,=20
Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld. They have no history in the =
movement, and=20
before 9/11 had little affinity to or affiliation with it.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">The=20
fathers of neoconservatism are former liberals or leftists. Today, its =
chief=20
proponents, to judge by <I><SPAN style=3D"FONT-STYLE: italic">their=20
</SPAN></I>history, are former realists. Ms. Rice, for example, was a =
disciple=20
of Brent Scowcroft; Mr. Cheney served as secretary of defense in the =
first Bush=20
administration. September 11 changed all of that. It changed the world, =
and=20
changed our understanding of the world. As neoconservatism seemed to =
offer the=20
most plausible explanation of the new reality and the most compelling =
and active=20
response to it, many realists were brought to acknowledge the poverty of =
realism--not just the futility but the danger of a foreign policy =
centered on=20
the illusion of stability and equilibrium. These realists, newly mugged =
by=20
reality, have given weight to neoconservatism, making it more diverse =
and, given=20
the newcomers' past experience, more mature. =
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">What=20
neoconservatives have long been advocating is now being articulated and=20
practiced at the highest levels of government by a war cabinet composed =
of=20
individuals who, coming from a very different place, have joined and =
reshaped=20
the neoconservative camp and are carrying the neoconservative idea =
throughout=20
the world. As a result, the vast right-wing conspiracy has grown even =
more vast=20
than liberals could imagine. And even as the tent has enlarged, the =
great=20
schisms and splits in conservative foreign policy--so widely predicted =
just a=20
year ago, so eagerly sought and amplified by outside analysts--have not=20
occurred. Indeed, differences have, if anything, narrowed.=20
<o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
10.0pt">This is=20
not party discipline. It is compromise with reality, and convergence =
toward the=20
middle. Above all, it is the maturation of a governing ideology whose =
time has=20
come. <o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><I><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-STYLE: italic; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; =
mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt">Mr.=20
Krauthammer is a nationally syndicated columnist for the Wa****ngton Post =
and an=20
essayist for Time. He won a Pulitzer Prize in 1987, and in 2003 was a =
recipient=20
of the Bradley Prize. This essay, in somewhat different form, was =
delivered in=20
New York City in May as Commentary's first annual Norman Podhoretz =
Lecture, and=20
it appears in the July/August issue of <A=20
href=3D"http://www.commentarymagazine.com/"
target=3D_blank><FONT=20
color=3D#000000>Commentary</FONT></A>.</SPAN></FONT></I><FONT =
face=3DArial><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt"> =
</SPAN></FONT><FONT=20
face=3DArial><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: =
7.5pt"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><STRONG>Received From:</STRONG> <A=20
title=3Djjjchao@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
href=3D"mailto:jjjchao@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"><FONT=20
color=3D#000000>jjjchao@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
></A> </SPAN></FONT></=
P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">VISION=20
RETROSPECTIVA DE LA EVOLUCION DEL MUNDO EN EL ULTIMO=20
SIGLO<o:p></o:p></SPAN></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman" size=3D3><SPAN=20
style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><FONT color=3D#0000ff><FONT face=3D"Arial =
Black"=20
color=3D#ff0000=20
size=3D1>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++</FONT></FONT></P>
<DIV>
<DIV class=3Dstorycredit align=3Dleft><FONT color=3D#0000ff><FONT =
face=3D"Arial Black"=20
size=3D1>Distributed by</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV class=3Dstorycredit align=3Dleft><FONT face=3D"Arial Black" =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D1>Chachi Novellas Bengochea</FONT></DIV>
<DIV class=3Dstorycredit align=3Dleft><FONT face=3D"Arial Black" =
color=3D#0000ff=20
size=3D1>Delray Beach, Florida, USA</FONT></DIV>
<DIV class=3Dstorycredit align=3Dleft><FONT face=3D"Arial Black" =
color=3D#ff0000=20
size=3D1>FOR FREEDOM & JUSTICE GROUP</FONT></DIV>
<DIV class=3Dstorycredit align=3Dleft><FONT face=3D"Arial Black" =
color=3D#000000=20
size=3D1><A=20
href=3D"http://groups.yahoo.com/grop/ForFreedomandJustice/">http://groups=
yahoo.com/grop/ForFreedomandJustice/</A></FONT></DIV>
<DIV class=3Dstorycredit align=3Dleft><FONT face=3D"Arial Black"=20
color=3D#ff0000>"Live-Free-or-Die"</FONT></DIV>
<DIV class=3Dstorycredit align=3Dleft><FONT face=3D"Arial Black" =
color=3D#ff0000=20
size=3D1>"One Nation UNDER GOD" "IN GOD WE=20
TRUST"</FONT></SPAN></FONT></DIV></DIV></DIV></DIV><STRONG><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
size=3D2>
<DIV><BR>-- <BR> <A=20
href=3D"http://therealcuba.com/Dennis.htm">http://therealcuba.com/Dennis.=
htm</A></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><A=20
href=3D"http://therealcuba.com/Page24.htm">http://therealcuba.com/Page24.=
htm</A></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV></FONT></STRONG> </DIV></BODY></HTML>
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