What's ya point don't cut and paste!
"randa" <rstreame@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
news:fpi943$h8t$1@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Hezbollah: The Deadly Cell Phone Ping?
>
>
> Summary.
>
> In the wake of the Feb. 12 assassination of top Hezbollah commander Imad
> Mughniyah, the organization has instructed its operatives to exercise
> caution when using cell phones to avoid becoming targets of Israeli
> attacks.
> Due to advancements in electronic surveillance, however, Hezbollah will
> have
> to do a lot more to evade the deadly cell phone ping.
>
> Fresh Analysis.... For CIA/MOSSAD, SS.
>
> Hezbollah has plenty of reasons to be paranoid in the wake of the Feb.
12
> assassination of top commander Imad Mughniyah. Not only does Israel
> possibly
> have more targeted assassinations in store, but Hezbollah cannot be sure
> of
> the origin of the leak that sacrificed its most seasoned and innovative
> operative.
>
> There are indications that Hezbollah suspects the leak came from Syrian
> intelligence. When Hezbollah officials like Mughniyah travel to
Damascus,
> they inform the Syrian authorities just before they cross the border
into
> Syria. Once they are inside the country, Syrian intelligence vehicles
> escort
> them to their destination. This is to say that the Syrian regime
> necessarily was complicit in the attack, you can be sure that Assef
> Shawkat
> did it--even if, Hezbollah remains a key asset for Damascus - but there
is
> a
> possibility that a foreign intelligence agency such as the Israeli
Mossad
> recruited an asset within the Syrian intelligence network. This could
> explain why Syria has maintained a highly defensive posture following
the
> assassination, making almost daily announcements about the progress of
the
> bombing investigation and indirectly blaming Israel and Western-backed
> Arab
> governments in the region....Let me make some Facts clear ounce and for
> all,
> The ONLY reason why the ASSADS are still in power in Syria, is because
> Israel's Government and Security establishment sup****ts a Alawite Regime
> in
> Syria. Period. Now, the Assads Regime "might" be showing some "cracks"
> from
> INSIDE it's structure, based on Family and Billions Stolen, tens of
> Billions.... since the "advent" of Assef Shawkat....
>
> Assef Shawkat "rammed" through the Assad's family, like a Bullet Train
in
> the 90s, and married Bushra.... following the Murder of BASIL al-Assad?
> Basil was adamantly opposed to this Monster....He rose through the
> ranks....especially since 2002. He moved way up on Feb. 13th 2005....
> In Feb. "13th 2008".... he is making moves for the KILL against the
> ASSADS,
> in order to become the NEW Dictator of Damascus himself NOW..... because
> BASHAR is too "enamored" with Hassan Nasrallah.....and ASSEF is
> not...Assef
> is sup****ted by the USA's services to the hilt, and they are trying to
> Help
> him make and prepare a winning strategy to replace BASHAR and the KILLER
> MAHER Al-ASSAD, with the "couple" ASSEF / BUSHRA ASSAD....
> Israel can live with this Strategy and is sup****ting it NOW. ........
may
> be
> !!! Israel will never sup****t a Strategy of Removing the Alawites
> completely, to replace them with a Sunni dominated Regime, which Chirac
> and
> Bush were....contemplating.... some time ago in 2006.... in fact BUSH
and
> US
> services, when push came to shove.....DID Not sup****t even including
> Damascus in the Israeli campaign of 2006, but pushed Chirac into coming
> out
> openly..., asking for it publicly, and the Israelis said NIET...Now,
there
> is a Coup D'état being "primed" in Damascus.... the timing remains a
> Mystery...? But you can be sure that Assef Shawkat will be the winner,
> should he be able to Pull it off.... with the HELP OF ......???? The
> Lebanese can only watch, and should never get embroiled in such a DOG's
> fight....Lebanon can't remedy that, but it can avoid tactless behavior
> that
> worsens the situation.... One key fact to remember. In addition to
acting
> as
> a "lily pad" from which the US and NATO can project power into Syria,
> Iraq,
> and beyond... we are meddling into muddy waters already... as is the
case
> in
> .........SCS....! Change in Syria will benefit Lebanon that much...,
it's
> not the possibility of a Sunni fundamentalist takeover that we should be
> concerned with in my opinion, this is a scarecrow that the Assad regime
> has
> propped up to justify its existence to the west, the problem is that
Syria
> wields too much power over Lebanon with the acquiescence of a lot of
> Lebanese, no one in Syria is crazy enough to give that up. If Assad
falls
> his replacement may not be as brutal but it's difficult to imagine less
> interference in Lebanese affairs...Then, for all intents and purposes,
our
> Problem is mainly an Internal Lebanese/Lebanese Problem .... which
should
> be
> addressed by "adult" Politicians asap, even if we have to TOSS all the
old
> ones out for good, and start anew....
>
> Following the assassination, Hezbollah has severely tightened security
in
> Lebanon and tem****arily curtailed the travel of any key officials to
> Syria.
> Stratfor has learned that the Hezbollah leader****p also has instructed
its
> cadres to be extremely vigilant in their movements and use of mobile
> phones.
> Hezbollah operatives are under strict orders not to answer phone calls
> from
> unknown callers. Instead, the operatives must first change locations and
> then return the calls if necessary.
>
> The reason for these instructions is the relative ease with which a
> hostile
> intelligence agency can triangulate a target's location by exploiting
the
> structure of GSM networks. Using either mobile identification or
> multilaterization, the location of the target phone can be determined
> within
> the network. Of these two methods, multilaterization (more commonly
known
> as
> phone pinging) is more precise, yielding accuracies within five meters
of
> the location of the phone. Hezbollah is operating on the logic that when
a
> call is received, a hard connection is made with the tower and the
> target's
> location immediately can be pinpointed. However, if the target first
moves
> to a different location before returning the call (preferably in an area
> with fewer network contact points, towers and receivers to enlarge the
> target scope), the mobile user likely will be harder to locate and will
be
> exposed to less risk.
>
> Mobile phone networks are not particularly useful for tracking moving
> targets on the street, unless the phones being used have GPS modules.
> However, this tactic still can help pinpoint facilities or verify that a
> target is at a particular location (such as the building where Mughniyah
> allegedly held a meeting with Hamas and Syrian intelligence officials)
> prior
> to the launch of a planned attack.
>
> This exploitation of phones also can be applied to those that rely on
> satellite networks. A case in point is the April 1996 assassination of
> Dzhokhar Musayevich Dudayev, the first president of Chechnya, in the
> heyday
> of the first Chechen war. Rumor has it that Dudayev was compromised by
> then-colleague Vladislav Surkov (who now is Russian President Vladimir
> Putin's
> deputy chief of staff) before the latter switched sides and allied with
> the
> Kremlin. Through Surkov, the Russian security establishment obtained
> Dudayev's
> personal phone numbers and triangulated his precise location while he
was
> using his satellite phone in southern Chechnya; Russian forces later
> dropped
> a 500-pound bomb on the safe house where he was hiding.
>
> Given that the instructions for cell phone use were given to Hezbollah
> operatives in the immediate aftermath of the Mughniyah assassination,
> there
> is a distinct possibility that a simple cell phone ping is what gave
away
> Mughniyah's location. That said, Mughniyah was obsessed with operational
> security and likely was well aware of the risks involved in using a cell
> phone. Nicknamed "the Fox," Mughniyah probably was not one to fall for
> such
> a trap.
>
> High-value targets like Mughniyah usually [don't carry any cell phones,
> ever, and Stratfor is Disinformation for CIA, Texas funded and Texas
> based,]
> to avoid being traced. There is always the possibility that a
compromised
> Syrian intelligence officer fitted Mughniyah's phone with a SIM card for
> the
> attackers to trace, but it would have been far easier for the source
> simply
> to inform the perpetrators of the time and location of Mughniyah's
> meeting.
> There is also the distinct possibility that software was installed on
his
> cell phone to facilitate targeting his location. This could have been
done
> by someone with access to his phone or, given the right resources, it
> could
> have been installed on the phone remotely from another phone or a
computer
> without his knowledge. Once the software is installed, it can calculate
> the
> user's location within the network and send this information to a preset
> place, either via e-mail or using SMS. However, this is dependent on the
> surveillant knowing the phone number for the SIM card, as well as the
> phone
> or SIM card having enough memory available to copy the program.
>
> Moreover, seasoned operatives like Mughniyah often are familiar with the
> U.S. government's cell phone tracking abilities, in addition to the
> practice
> of using multilaterization and network exploitation to pinpoint a
target's
> location. These methods utilize the signals used by networks and phones
to
> communicate and exchange data when they are connected. Phones often
> receive
> redundant signals while connected, which ensures that continuous
> communication can occur even while the user is moving considerable
> distances. The strength of the signals varies with the distance between
> the
> device and the tower or communication point, allowing a phone to be
> located
> within a particular network. By calculating either the strength of the
> tower
> signals being received by the phone or the time it takes them to reach
the
> device, the phone's location can be triangulated. The owner of the phone
> does not even need to be using it for this to take place, but it must be
> connected to the network. The most effective way to beat this system,
> therefore, is to remove either the battery or the SIM card - or both -
> from
> the phone when it is not in use.
>
> The FBI also has earned the U.S. government several lawsuits by turning
> criminals' cell phones into microphones and transmitters for
> eavesdropping.
> This process, known as using a roving bug, can be carried out by getting
> the
> mobile provider to remotely install a piece of software on a handset
> without
> the owner's knowledge that activates the microphone - even if the target
> is
> not on a call.
>
> The instructions given to Hezbollah operatives on cell phone use thus
> reflect a high degree of naiveté...., High-value targets like Mughniyah
> usually [don't carry any cell phones, ever, and Stratfor is
Disinformation
> for CIA, Texas funded and Texas based,] on the part of Hezbollah's
> leader****p. Even the Hamas leaders, who also have gone underground for
> fear
> of Israeli reprisal attacks, have taken far more logical measures to
avoid
> detection. According to a Feb. 12 Al Hayat re****t, high-value Hamas
> targets
> are prohibited from using cell phones. A center in Gaza has also been
> created to filter landline calls for these leaders, and callers must
enter
> a
> pass code before their calls will go through....
>
> Despite the security risks associated with cell phone use, the devices
> have
> become as much of a necessity for militant organizations like Hezbollah
as
> they have for businessmen. Counterterrorism operations can continue to
> benefit from this and further advances in electronic surveillance
> technology. Hezbollah operatives, meanwhile, will have to take more
> extraordinary measures to avoid having their phone conversations end
with
> a
> boom.....High-value targets like Mughniyah usually [don't carry any cell
> phones, ever, and Stratfor is Disinformation for CIA, Texas funded and
> Texas
> based,]
>
>
>
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