STATEMENT OF MR. MAHFUD ALI BEIBA
Head of the Delegation of the Frente POLISARIO
Manhasset - Fourth Round
17 March 2008
His Excellency Mr Peter Van Walsum
Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara,
Mr Julian Harston,
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara
Ladies and Gentlemen members of the UN delegation,
Members of the delegation of Morocco,
Members of the delegations of the neighbouring countries, Algeria and
Mauritania
Mr Personal Envoy,
We gather again here in Manhasset under your auspices within the framework
established by resolutions 1754 and 1783 (2007) whereby the Security
Council
called on the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco to enter into negotiations, in
good faith, with a view to achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict
that provides for the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination.
As we had the op****tunity to recall in Manhasset I, Morocco had committed
itself to the respect for and implementation of this fundamental right,
until it decided to invade and occupy by force our country in 1975 in the
context of a project of territorial expansion of which other countries of
the region had already been direct targets.
In that year, our people were a victim of a war of extermination where
Napalm and white Phosphorus were used, a war that continues to date by
means
of a policy of violation of human rights that has caused hundreds of both
civilian and military disappeared, arbitrary detentions and torture that
are
being carried out with impunity owing to the media blackout imposed on the
Territory.
We are a people that have shown determination and political will to resist
and to continue their resistance until the full attainment, today or
tomorrow, of their legitimate right to self-determination and
independence.
Yet we have spared no effort to give tangible possibilities for a peaceful
solution to the conflict that was imposed on us by force, following the
withdrawal of the European colonial power, by a neighbour from whom we
expected sup****t and solidarity.
In 1991, by accepting the Settlement Plan by virtue of which the Security
Council deployed MINURSO to the Territory, Morocco seemed to return to
reason and to its prior commitment to allow the Sahrawi people to decide
freely their future by opting for independence or integration into this
country within the framework of a self-determination referendum organised
and supervised by the United Nations in cooperation with the Organisation
of
African Unity.
Despite the obstructions put in the way of the identification of voters,
Morocco reaffirmed once again, in an equivocal manner to James Baker,
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, its attachment to the referendum
process (S/1997/882 of 13 November 1997). Houston Agreements that were
accepted by Morocco and endorsed by the Security Council describe in
detail
all the steps that should be taken until the proclamation of the results
of
the self-determination referendum.
Everything was ready for the achievement of a just and lasting peace.
However, as James Baker reaffirmed in August 2004, Morocco decided "that
it
was no longer ready to go forward with the process". It then began
pursuing
a policy marked by reneging on its commitments and turning its back on
international legality.
The process leading to the referendum has henceforth been stopped by the
unilateral decision of Morocco, and not by a pur****ted
"unimplementability"
of the referendum or by the incapacity of the United Nations to bring the
process to conclusion, as Morocco claims.
The delegation of the Frente POLISARIO is firmly convinced that the
referendum process can and should be reactivated following the guidelines
and phases clearly detailed in the Settlement Plan, in the Houston
Agreements and Baker Plan, which cannot be thrown into the wastepaper of
history because of a hasty and irrational decision taken in a bad mood.
These agreements represent a great and the only concurrence between the
parties, and between them and the United Nations for a just and lasting
solution to the conflict. To try to impose the elaboration of a new
framework of solution on the basis of something that goes against the
spirit, the letter and the objective of the peace agreements, which were
already accepted and endorsed by the Security Council, is an attempt to
which the Frente POLISARIO and, with certainty, the United Nations, the
region and Africa cannot subscribe or endorse.
In fact, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy stated unequivocally
that "the United Nations cannot sponsor a plan that excluded a referendum
with independence as an option while claiming to provide for the
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara" (para.14, S/2006/817
of
16 October 2006).
Likewise, the position taken for over 20 years by the Organisation of
African Unity (now the African Union) and by the majority of the countries
of the region of northwest Africa regarding the Sahrawi question leaves no
room for doubt about the principles that should guide any search for a
just
and lasting peace.
There are therefore principles of international law that are essential for
the United Nations as well as positions and facts that have resisted the
passage of time, and their strength has dashed the expectations of the
other party regarding the loss of their consistency and value.
It is against this background that we have welcomed the op****tunity that
was
opened in April 2007 by the Security Council resolution 1754, and have
taken
part, in good faith, in the Manhasset negotiation process.
Unfortunately, as we have seen in its unjustified rejection of Baker Plan,
and its obstruction of the implementation of Houston Agreements and the
Settlement Plan and as we have also witnessed in the previous rounds,
Morocco does not seem yet to have understood the message, and continues to
insist on a proposal based on one option only, which aims to legitimise an
anachronistic expansionist project that violates the UN Charter, and
ignores
the terms of reference established by the international community for
resolving the conflict of Western Sahara.
We would like, Mr Personal Envoy, to state before you and before the
Moroccan delegation the following, with the formal request that this
statement be brought to the attention of the Secretary-General and the
Security Council:
1. The Frente POLISARIO is ready to cooperate in the rigorous
implementation
of the two resolutions of the Security Council, 1754 and 1783 (2007), that
reaffirm the validity and relevance of the principle of self-determination
for the people of a territory that is still on the list of the Special
Committee of Decolonisation 33 years after the withdrawal of the European
colonial power. The United Nations does not recognise for the present
occupying power the sovereignty or even the status of an administering
power, as stated in the opinion of the UN Legal Department issued on 29
January 2002.
2. Our view on the implementability of these resolutions is well-known. We
believe that the objective of Manhasset negotiations, as was the case of
the
previous negotiations in Houston, London and Lisbon, is to ensure the
implementation--and not the negation--of the right of the Sahrawi people
to
self-determination in line with the terms of reference established by the
international community in the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
This vision is flexible and broad because it includes all the options for
a
self-determination referendum in conformity with this resolution. It is a
question of allowing the Sahrawi people to have the last word regarding
their future. No credible country or international organisation can be
against this principle.
3. The two parties should cooperate for assisting the United Nations to
bring to an end the last phase of the referendum process taking into
account
the recent proposals, and the part of the distance already covered by the
United Nations with a view to reaching the proclamation of the results of
the referendum.
4. Our understanding consists, in short, in letting the United Nations
have
the responsibility for bringing this process to conclusion by asking the
Sahrawi people about what they want regarding their future. We do not
prejudge the outcome, and we do not want to impose it either. We want the
Sahrawi people to have the possibility to go to the polls, which represent
the peaceful and democratic way to bring to an end this protracted
conflict
whose continuation does not serve the credibility of the United Nations,
the
security and stability of the region nor the development of its peoples.
5. It is out of our will to contribute to the success of this process that
the Frente POLISARIO has accepted, and still accepts, to engage
constructively in discussing the issue of the confidence-building measures
(CBMs) that you proposed in the second round of negotiations. There is
also
the highly sensitive issue relating to the respect for human rights in the
Territory that you, Mr Personal Envoy, referred to in the third round as
"probably the best confidence-building measure", while underlying that "it
would be unrealistic to find a mutually acceptable solution without
addressing the question of human rights in the context of our
negotiations".
We regret that the Moroccan delegation was not willing to engage in
discussing this matter in the context of the previous rounds of
negotiation.
Although the Security Council called on us, in its resolution 1783 (2007),
to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious
for
dialogue, Morocco continues to perpetrate gross violations of human rights
in the occupied territories, while remaining opposed to a fundamental
human
right, namely the right to self-determination. Obviously, this highly
condemnable behaviour is yet another demonstration of Morocco's lack of
political will, and it can in no way contribute to creating the atmosphere
of trust needed for the success of the negotiations.
6. Morocco has, since 2004, its own surprising version of this right. In
fact, it opposes this right by wrongfully limiting it to just one option
in
a way that goes against the letter and spirit of the General Assembly
resolution 1514 (XV), which stipulates that the right to
self-determination
should be exercised in accordance with the freely expressed will and
desire
of the people concerned.
The Moroccan delegation came to Manhasset to reiterate that it is ready to
negotiate only a solution that would recognise beforehand the
"Moroccanity"
of Western Sahara. This position preconditions and prejudges the outcome
of
the negotiations. In no way can it be called negotiations; rather, it is
imposition. It also confuses self-determination with forcible annexation.
Moreover, Morocco argued for the impossibility of holding a referendum,
but
at the same time considers that its so-called proposal for solution
provides
for this referendum.
What we see, in the final analysis, is an untenable position vis-à-vis the
UN Charter and the terms of reference established by the Security Council
from day one of its involvement in the solution process. What we also see
is
an "approach" that is fraught with fundamental contradictions in terms of
the relevance and viability of a referendum, which is unachievable for
Morocco if the ballot options include independence, and is feasible if the
only option is the so-called "autonomy".
As all the previous peace plans endorsed by the UN Security Council, the
Frente POLISARIO considers that the referendum is possible and should be
held with at least two options.
Mr Personal Envoy,
The Frente POLISARIO has offered Morocco a proposal for solution of which
the Security Council has taken note in its resolutions 1754 and 1783
(2007).
This proposal has the merit of not only complying fully with the
international legality but also laying out a vision for the future that
would be conducive to the establishment of friendly and cooperative
relations with Morocco in political, economic and security domains. The
Frente POLISARIO is also committed to accepting the results of the
referendum, whatever they are, and to negotiate with Morocco, under the
auspices of the United Nations, the guarantees that could be granted to
our
northern neighbour, and to address all those areas that are of special
concern to it, in the event that the voters in the self-determination
referendum opt for the independence of Western Sahara.
We believe that there is a need to avoid that the process becomes
deadlocked, because it could lead to perilous consequences for all, for
the
parties, the region and for the credibility and capacity of the United
Nations in the resolution of the conflict, which may affect directly the
international peace and security. However, the Moroccan refusal to discuss
our proposal for solution together with its opposition to discussing the
proposed confidence-building measures, and its continuous violation of
human
rights in the Territory carry the seeds of a possible stalemate.
Furthermore, the behaviour of the Moroccan side in Manhasset is
accompanied
these days by facts on the ground relating to huge movements of troops,
military manoeuvres and massive logistical preparations in the occupied
areas of Dakhla, Auserd and south-eastern Morocco that point towards a
possible breach of the cease-fire whose consequences only Morocco should
assume before the region and the world at large.
Mr Personal Envoy,
This is the fourth round in the Manhasset negotiation process. You have
deployed enormous efforts and demonstrated a great deal of patience. Your
recent visit to the region has served to deepen the discussion and the
awareness of the urgency of a just and lasting solution to a conflict that
has caused suffering, destruction, insecurity and rift among the peoples
of
the region. We would like to thank you as well as your team for your
perseverance and encouragement for a peace in conformity with
international
legality. Our appreciation goes also to the two neighbouring countries.
You will agree with us, Mr. Personal Envoy, that the negotiation should
lead
to overcoming the obstacles and moving forward in the right direction. It
cannot become an end in itself, and cannot be undermined with
preconditions
that makes it lose its raison d'être.
The Security Council has called on us to negotiate without preconditions,
in
good faith, with a view to ensuring the respect for the right of the
Sahrawi
people to self-determination. We ought therefore to allow you and the
United
Nations to take the necessary steps to bring the process to conclusion, by
giving the Sahrawi people the peaceful and democratic op****tunity, which
is
in keeping with international legality, to decide their future opting for
one of the two proposals that the parties submitted to the United Nations
in
April 2007.
Your predecessor, James Baker, with the agreement of the two parties,
paved
the way for reaching this moment by detailing what should be done
regarding
the identification of voters, the confinement of troops, the return of the
refugees and the electoral campaign as well as the proclamation of the
results of the referendum. It is to be recalled that the late king Hassan
II
declared that he "would respect those results". Today, Morocco is saying
that its proposal can and should be submitted to a popular vote. This
means,
in other words, that the position of Morocco has evolved, and that it
believes that a referendum is possible now. In this case, let the UN
organise the said referendum, let Morocco campaign for its autonomy, let
the
Frente POLISARIO campaign for the independence option, and then let the
people of Western Sahara decide.
We think that, if we take these elements into consideration, there are
real
possibilities for achieving a substantive progress. The United Nations
today
should take advantage of this op****tunity and assume its responsibility,
since it seems to us that it cannot find a historic chance better than the
one derived from these elements. It also should not stay paralysed before
a
conflict of decolonisation whose lack of resolution affects its
credibility
and threaten regional peace and stability.
We therefore hope that this round would be decisive for moving ahead
towards
the peace that would offer us all the possibility to continue believing
that
everything was useful and that Manhasset, as was the case with Houston in
the past, was useful, because it opened new possibilities for a just and
lasting peace that is in keeping with international legality.
Thank you!
______________________________________________________________
Forwarded by:
Norwegian Sup****t Committee for Western Sahara
*** Referendum now! ***
www.vest-sahara.no
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Sahara-update
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