Dear Marko,
If a poster writes something and then you seem incapable of reading what =
is written, don't expect responses to malinterpretations. I personally=20
think that your only recourse to further malinterpretations, insults and =
inability to converse is for you and the "catawumpus" to converse with=20
one another.
Marko Amnell wrote:
>On 20 touko, 00:29, ++ <fri...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> =20
>
>>Marko Amnell wrote:
>> =20
>>
>
>[...]
>
> =20
>
>>>"According to Transparency International, the only
>>>country with higher income per capita and more
>>>corruption than Russia is Equatorial Guinea. That is
>>>hardly a standard worthy of a great nation."
>>> =20
>>>
>>>http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1016/42/362262.htm
>>> =20
>>>
>>>Still no evidence? Well, why don't you contact
>>>Transparency International and ask them how
>>>they arrived at that conclusion.
>>> =20
>>>
>>And you are assuming that people here aren't familiar with Transparency=
>>International...
>> =20
>>
>
>Let's get back to my initial disagreement with you.
>You said that Russia is a Western country. That
>is what I disagreed with. The high level of corruption
>is just one indication that Russia is not a Western
>country. It's not even the most fundamental reason.
>The fundamental reason is that Russia has
>developed a new model of economic development.
>This is an interesting turn of events in world
>history. Among other things, it disproves Francis
>Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history."
>The most interesting theorist of this new model
>of economic development is Sergei Karaganov.
>I posted a link to one of his articles earlier.
>Here is the link again.
>
>http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/21/1148.html
>
>Below is the part that deals with the new model
>of economic development. If you want to argue
>that Russia is a Western country, you should
>counter Karaganov's arguments (and other
>similar arguments showing that Russia is not
>developing according to the Western model).
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>There is yet another aspect to this bitter global rivalry, namely, the
>emerging struggle between two models of development =96 liberal-
>democratic capitalism of the traditional West, and =93authoritarian
>capitalism=94 led by the Asian =93tigers=94 and =93dragons.=94 The West
>considered the rapid economic progress of the Southeast Asian
>countries and South Korea to be an exception rather than a rule.
>However, China=92s rapid growth, despite predictions over the past 20
>years about its imminent collapse, does not permit indulging in
>escapism anymore.
>
>The victory of liberal-democratic capitalism in the Cold War created
>an illusion that this victory was final. The =93end of history,=94
>predicted by Francis Fukuyama, has not materialized, but not simply
>because the collapse of the bloc system has brought about growing
>chaos. As it turned out, competition is not over: the defeated planned
>socialist economy has been replaced by a new model, which potentially
>is very attractive, especially to the former Third World countries =96
>that is, the majority of humanity. This model is authoritarian semi-
>democratic capitalism, effective economically and acceptable
>politically.
>Unlike Communism, capitalism ensures the growth (albeit an uneven
>growth) of the wellbeing for the majority of people; and unlike
>totalitarian Communism, authoritarianism =96 or limited democracy =96
>ensures an acceptable level of personal freedom for the same
>majority.
>
>The rivalry between the two varieties of capitalism was analyzed by
>Israeli strategist Azar Gat in the influential U.S. journal Foreign
>Affairs. =93Authoritarian capitalist states, today exemplified by China
>and Russia, may represent a viable alternative path to modernity,
>which in turn suggests that there is nothing inevitable about liberal
>democracy=92s ultimate victory =96 or future dominance,=94 he wrote. =93=
A
>successful nondemocratic Second World could then be regarded by many
>as an attractive alternative to liberal democracy.=94
>
>It may well be that =93authoritarian capitalism=94 is only one stage in
>the development toward a more liberal model. After all, before the
>second half of the last century, many countries in Western Europe and
>the United States had features that are now characteristic of those
>states that have so-called authoritarian capitalism.
>Nevertheless, the liberal-democratic victors now see that they are
>beginning to suffer defeat. The =93mission=94 in the Middle East has
>weakened the global position of the United States, which in turn has
>made democracy per se less attractive. Furthermore, the mostly
>unsuccessful =91color revolutions=92 im****ted to former Soviet republics=
>was a less noticeable, yet substantial, blow to the idea of democracy.
>Meanwhile, the democratic elections in Palestine have plunged the
>country into a civil war. Lebanon, which is quite democratic, has been
>set on fire, while its neighbor =96 the authoritarian Syria =96 is
>developing quite well.
>
>The competition of models is not just a struggle for the sense of
>moral superiority. In the long run, the victory of a particular model
>will be translated into a redistribution of manpower and other
>resources in favor of those states that sup****t such a model. The
>period from the late 1980s to the beginning of the 2000s saw a huge
>redistribution of resources in favor of the United States and Western
>Europe. Now the process may reverse itself, especially as the success
>of authoritarian capitalism and the weakening of the positions of
>democracy have coincided in time with another tectonic ****ft: the
>center of the global economy and geopolitics is moving away from the
>Euro-Atlantic to the Asian space.
>
>States that are liberal-democratic yet economically weak must
>automatically orient themselves to the West and follow in the wake of
>its policy. However, if another model proves successful, some states
>will have an op****tunity to reorient themselves, or at least have more
>room for maneuver.
>Russia, for example =96 by demonstrating to the post-Soviet and
>developing countries that they can successfully organize their
>economies in other ways, and not only according to the dependent
>liberal-democratic model of Central and Eastern Europe =96 is restoring,=
>albeit very slowly, its ability to attract medium-developed societies
>and countries. Many neighboring societies, tired of poverty, chaos and
>uncertainty, are eager to emulate the sovereign system of Russia,
>which is showing growth and is better governed. In addition,
>authoritarian rulers of many states prefer to have a tough yet
>predictable Russia that would not encroach on their sovereignty as
>their neighbor.
>
>History has pushed Russia into the center of a new competitive
>struggle between the liberal-democratic and authoritarian models of
>capitalism. Russia is a key state from the point of view of
>competition between political and socio-economic models, and is,
>moreover, capable of tipping the military-political balance in the
>world.
>Mistrust toward the authoritarian development model largely explains
>European suspicion about Russia=92s energy policy. An authoritarian
>state finds it easier to manipulate its energy and other assets for
>foreign-policy purposes. In this sense, democracy, especially weak
>democracy, is more convenient for partners, as it is less suited for
>such manipulation.
>
>So, Russia is now in the midst of two new competitions at once, which
>will largely determine the future of the world. These are competitions
>between energy producers and consumers for control over energy
>resources, and between different varieties of capitalism. Moreover,
>Russia is situated on three critical divides =96 between radical Islam
>and Christian civilization, between the rich and the poor, and between
>Europe and Asia.
>In the past, the latter divide was a choice between modernity and
>backwardness, freedom and tyranny, individualism and collectivism, and
>capitalism and feudalism, and in the long run, between progress and
>stagnation. Today, however, the rapidly growing East has actually
>become a new West.
>
>
> =20
>
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