Occupation case studies: Algeria and Turkey
By K Gajendra Singh
"We studied history at school that taught us to say freedom or death.
I think you know well that we as a people have our experience with the
colonialists." - US ambassador April Glaspie to Saddam Hussein in
Baghdad on July 25, 1990.
While formulating foreign policy options, political leaders also look
to history for guidance. Unfortunately, the United State's history is
only two centuries old, and to meet the challenge of terrorism,
Frankenstein monsters partly of its own creation, the mujahideen,
jihadis, the Taliban and al-Qaeda , the US can only recall a long
genocidal war against its native Americans.
Those who resisted were called "terrorists" for defending their native
land and way of life against foreign invaders. There are Hollywood
films galore that depict the "American Indians" as savages to be
hunted down by the US cavalry.
The same cavalry units now force Iraqis daily to lie face down in the
land of their ancestors and describe those fighting to free their
country from the occupying forces as "terrorists". The Iraqis, other
Arabs and Iranians are the new "American Indians", and those who
collaborate with the Bush administration are like the good Indians who
helped the Americans fight and defeat bad Indians.
So the display of a seemingly drugged and unwashed Saddam Hussein was
to assert white Christian supremacy over the natives. US policy in
Iraq and the region is pure and simple, blatant neo-colonization.
After Vietnam and Afghanistan, the Middle East is the new American
West. The US administration, scared of Islamic fundamentalism and
religious fanatics, has yet to evolve a coherent policy to counter it.
But it is turning occupied Iraq into an oligarchy of crony capitalism,
after an ill-advised and illegal war on Iraq, set off and egged on by
Christian fundamentalists at the core of the administration.
The idea of nationalism - developed by the West - socialism, rule of
law, fraternity and equality, have been abolished in the discourse
since September 11. But the sturdy plant of nationalism in Iraq cannot
be eliminated by going into denial mode. According to Iraqi opposition
and other sources, there are perhaps more than 50 different resistance
organizations, including Ba'athists, communists, nationalists,
ca****ered soldiers discarded by the occupation, and Sunni and ****'ite
religious groups, as well as foreign elements. In reality, almost
everyone is opposed to foreign occupation.
In an era of nation states based on patriotism and shared history,
people just hate occupying powers. While Vietnam's example and its
people's fight for freedom and making it a quagmire for US forces has
been talked about, Iraq's comparison with post World War 2 Germany and
Japan shows little historic understanding. The ground situation and
the evolution of the war for independence in Muslim, Arab, and till
now secular Iraq, is closer to the wars of independence in Algeria and
Turkey.
In a November 2003 re****t by MEDACT, the London-based affiliate of
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and
Physicians for Social Responsibility, it was estimated that the number
of Iraqis killed since the invasion in March was between 20,000 and
55,000, including at least 8,000 civilians, with upwards of 20,000
civilian casualties.
The Algerian war of independence lasted from 1954 to 1962, in which
almost every family lost a member, a son, a cousin, a nephew,
willingly or unwillingly sacrificed at the alter of freedom, self
respect and dignity. After its defeat in World War 1, when the Ottoman
empire lay supine under the heels of Allied power in its capital
Istanbul with the Sultan Caliph a captive, the national leader****p,
led by Mustapha Kemal and his comrades, mostly former Ottoman
soldiers, aroused the m***** of Anatolia to make yet another supreme
effort to expel the Greeks and other occupying powers.
Algerian case study
When I arrived in Algeria in 1964 from Egypt as a young diplomat, one
saw very few young men between the ages of 14 and 40 years in the
streets of Algiers, its capital . One million Algerians out of a
population of 11 million had been killed in the war for independence
against France. When president Ahmed Ben Bella was ousted by his
defense minister Colonel Houari Boumedienne in June 1965, there was
almost no violence. Algerians had had enough bloodletting. Ben Bella
was quietly taken away from the president's palace, just across from
my 4th floor apartment. The Battle of Algiers, now being screened for
the benefit of US decision makers, was filmed in 1965.
Like Operation Iraqi Freedom and other US claims to usher democracy
into Iraq and the Middle East now, during World War 2, Allied and Axis
powers in their Arabic radio broadcasts promised freedom and a new
world for the natives. Ferhat Abbas drafted an Algerian manifesto in
December 1942 for presentation to Allied and French authorities for
political autonomy for Algeria. Following General Charles de Gaulle's
promise in 1943 for their loyalty, some categories of Muslims in North
Africa were granted French citizen****p, but this did not go far enough
to satisfy Algerian aspirations. When Algerian nationalist flags were
displayed at Sitif in May 1945, French authorities fired on
demonstrators. In a spontaneous uprising, 84 European settlers were
massacred. The violence and suppression that followed resulted in the
death of about 8,000 Muslims (according to French sources) or as many
as 45,000 (according to Algerian sources). That laid the foundations
for the Algerian War of Independence, which began in earnest 10 years
later.
A number of nationalist groups and parties were organized in Algeria
even before World War 2, which became increasingly radicalized when
peaceful means failed to obtain freedom. A radical paramilitary group,
the Special Organization (Organization Spiciale; OS) formed in the mid
1940s was discovered in 1950 and many of its leaders imprisoned. In
1954, a group of former OS members formed the Revolutionary Committee
of Unity and Action (Comiti Rivolutionaire d'Uniti et d'Action; CRUA).
This organization, later to become the FLN, made preparations for
military action. The leading members of the CRUA became the so-called
chefs historiques (historical leaders) of the Algerian War of
Independence: Hocine Aot-Ahmed, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Moustapha Ben
Boulaid, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche, Belkacem Krim, Mohamed
Khider, Rabah Bitat, and Ahmed Ben Bella. They organized and led
several hundred men in the first armed confrontations.
The Algerian war of Independence was ignited in 1954 in the Aures
mountains. It was at first dismissed as just colonial trouble. The
armed uprising soon intensified and spread, gradually affecting larger
parts of the country, and some regions - notably the northeastern
parts of Little Kabylia and parts of the Aurhs Mountains - became
guerrilla strongholds that were beyond French control. France became
more involved in the conflict, drafting some 2 million conscripts over
the course of the war. To counter the spread of the uprising, the
French National Assembly declared a state of emergency.
Jacques Soustelle arrived in Algiers as the new governor-general in
February 1955, but his new plan was ineffective. Soon the situation
developed into a full-scale war with French military rule, censor****p
and terrorism and torture. White French and European settlers known as
pied noires (black feet) thrice challenged the central government in
Paris.
The white European settler population was part of Algeria for
generations, perhaps much longer than any other settler community in
Africa, with the mother country just across the Mediterranean. The
French were almost as numerous as the Muslim Algerians in the main
cities and had rendered conspicuous services to Algeria.
A decisive turn in the war for independence took place in August 1955,
when a widespread armed outbreak in Skikda, north of the Constantine
region, led to the killings of nearly 100 Europeans and Muslim
officials. Countermeasures by both the French army and settlers
claimed the lives of somewhere between 1,200 (according to French
sources) and 12,000 (according to Algerian sources) Algerians. A
French army of 500,000 troops was sent to Algeria to counter the rebel
strongholds in the more distant ****tions of the country, while the
rebels collected money for their cause and took reprisals against
fellow Muslims who would not cooperate with them. By the spring of
1956 a majority of previously non-committed political leaders, such as
Ferhat Abbas and Tawfiq al-Madani, joined FLN leaders in Cairo, where
the group established its headquarters.
The first FLN congress took place in August-September 1956 in the
Soummam Valley between Great and Little Kabylia and brought together
the FLN leader****p in an appraisal of the war and its objectives.
Algeria was divided into six autonomous zones (wilayat ), each led by
guerrilla commanders who later played key political roles in the
country. The congress also produced a written program on the aims and
objectives of the war and set up the National Council for the Algerian
Revolution (Conseil National de la Rivolution Algirienne) and the
Committee of Coordination and Enforcement (Comiti de Coordination et
d'Exicution), the latter acting as the executive branch of the FLN.
Externally, the major event of 1956 was the French decision to grant
full independence to Morocco and Tunisia and to concentrate on
retaining "French Algeria". The Moroccan sultan and premier Habib
Bourguiba of Tunisia, hoping to find an acceptable solution to the
Algerian problem, called for a meeting in Tunis with im****tant
Algerian leaders (including Ben Bella, Boudiaf, Khider and Aot-Ahmed)
who were the guests of the sultan in Rabat. French intelligence
officers, however, hijacked the plane chartered by the Moroccan
government to Oran instead of Tunis. The Algerian leaders were
arrested and imprisoned in France for the rest of the war. This act
hardened the resolve of the Algerian leader****p and provoked an attack
on Meknhs, Morocco, that cost the lives of 40 French settlers before
the Moroccan government could restore order.
After the meeting with the Moroccan sultan at Rabat at the end of
1957, Bourguiba again offered to mediate, but the French, deceived
into optimism by some recent successes in the field, declined.
Bourguiba wanted a peaceful solution, because of growing links between
the FLN and Egypt. A Maghrib federation to include an independent
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia was also discussed.
From the beginning of 1956 and lasting until the summer of the
following year, the FLN tried to paralyze the administration of
Algiers through what has come to be known as the Battle of Algiers.
Attacks by the FLN against both military and civilian European targets
were countered by paratroopers led by General Jacques Massu. To stem
the tide of FLN attacks, the French military resorted to the torture
and summary execution of hundreds of suspects. The entire leader****p
of the FLN was eventually eliminated or forced to flee. The French
also cut Algeria off from independent Tunisia and Morocco by erecting
barbed wire fences that were illuminated at night by searchlights.
This separated the Algerian resistance bands within the country from
some 30,000 armed Algerians on the frontiers of Tunisia and Morocco.
Constitutionally declared a part of metropolitan France, the Frenchmen
maintained a stubborn belief that Algeria was French, while others
wondered why the French were unable to see that their days as rulers
in Algeria were numbered. Like other colonists, the sudden descent
from the first rank world colonial power was too much. The British in
the Middle East after the retreat from India also made the mistake by
hanging on to Egypt and even invaded it along with France and Israel
in 1956. It ended in disaster.
After their retreat from Indo-China, senior French officers in Algeria
took their role with a sense of mission which distorted their sense of
pro****tion and led them in the end to jettison their oaths of
allegiance and violation of human rights.
The settler French community arrogated to itself an authority which
belonged rightly to Paris. The weaknesses and divisions of the
governments of the Fourth Republic in Paris allowed this authority to
be enhanced and exercised in Algiers recklessly until the return of
General de Gaulle in 1958. Some French governor-generals in Algeria
did try to alleviate their repression of nationalism with some
economic developments and reforms, but the nationalists' aim was full
independence.
In the first phase of the revolt after the defeat of the Faure
government in November 1955, a fresh general election installed a
minority government led by Guy Mollet. Mollet went to Algiers where he
was pelted with garbage by pied noirs, while talks with the FLN
leaders remained totally unproductive. A widely respected and liberal
General Catroux appointed governor general by Mollet resigned his
office without even leaving France.
By May 1956, Mollet felt that he had taken enough risks and in a trial
of strength between Paris and the Europeans in Algeria, and Paris
might not win. During the next 18 months political attitudes remained
rigid, the French army and the FLN established positions in which
neither could defeat the other. Terrorism mounted on both sides and
even spread to Paris and other cities in France. Torture became a
regular instrument of government, with retaliation by the FLN. The
impasse seemed to be complete, politically and militarily. The
European community's preoccupation with repression left little room
for anything else.
On May 28, 1958, Pierre Pflimlin, the last prime minister of the
Fourth French Republic, resigned, becoming the sixth victim of the
Algerian war. On May 13, Algiers had rebelled against Paris planning
to seize power in Paris by a coup on May 30. Most of Corsica had
accepted the rebel regime and half the commanders of the military
regions in France were believed to be disloyal. Then on June 1 emerged
General de Gaulle, World War 2 hero of the French resistance who was
invested with full powers. He flew to Algiers on June 4, but kept his
cards close to his chest, but he probably saw the inevitable.
By a mixture of authority and ambiguity, he imposed his will and
gradually acquired the power to impose a solution. It was a masterly
performance, but it took him nearly four years. He did enough to
retain the initiative, but would not reveal his plans, thus preventing
potentially hostile groups from acting against him until it was too
late. He normalized relations with Tunisia and Morocco, agreeing to
withdraw French forces from both countries (except from the Tunisian
naval base at Bizerta). He transferred from Algeria many senior
officers who could not disobey the general. General Salan, a prime
rallying point for rebels and leader of the May putsch, tem****arily
retained his command, but was relieved of his civilian duties.
After preliminary moves and with cautious deliberation, de Gaulle
delivered his first major statement on the future status of Algeria in
September 1959. He offered a choice (similar to France's colonies in
western and central Africa in 1958)between independence, integration
with France and association with France. The choice was to be made
within four years from the end of hostilities, defined as any year in
which fewer than 200 people were killed in fighting or by terrorism.
It was followed by another pied noires revolt on January 24, 1960 when
the European community opposed even de Gaulle. The revolt was a
failure because the French government acted quickly in Algeria and at
home. But to Algerians, de Gaulle's offer was no more than a half-way
house. The FLN wanted full independence. Sup****t for de Gaulle in
France was more widespread in 1960 than in 1958. People felt that the
war had gone on for too long and they were opposed to the violent
means used.
Henri Alleg's book La Question focused on the use of torture by units
of the French army. The trial of Alleg in 1960, followed by the
disappearance and murder of the French communist and university
lecturer Maurice Audin, the trial in 1961 of the Algerian girl Djamila
Boupacha, protests by Roman Catholic cardinals occupying French sees
and a manifesto signed by 121 leading intellectuals all contributed to
turn French opinion against the settler French community and the
French army in Algeria.
Toward the end of 1960 the leaders of the January revolt were
themselves put on trial. But still one more settler rebellion
occurred, in April 1961, led by four generals, which lasted for four
days. Two of the four generals, Salan and Jouhaud, were subsequently
sentenced to death in absentia and the other two, Challe and Zeller,
who surrendered, were given 15 years imprisonment - all sentences were
eventually reduced.
Out of the failed rebellion rose the Organization de l'Armee Secrete
(OAS) which resorted to terrorism and by creating among the European
population fears of reprisals by an independent Algerian government,
provoked (as independence became inevitable ) an exodus which deprived
the country of much-needed skills in administration, education and
other public services. The lesson was well learnt by leaders in South
Africa when it became independent at the end of an apartheid regime.
De Gaulle's efforts in Algeria did not improve relations with the
nationalist forces. In September 1959, the FLN proclaimed a
provisional Algerian government with Ferhat Abbas as prime minister
and the imprisoned Ben Bella as his deputy. It then turned for help to
Moscow and Beijing. During 1960 it became apparent that the non-
combatant Algerians favored the FLN and its unequivocal demand for
independence, which made de Gaulle turn to negotiations with the FLN.
In July de Gaulle, in a televised speech, unequivocally accepted
Algerian independence, but the FLN adopted a more assertive line when
Yusuf Ben Khedda succeeded a moderate Ferhat Abbas as the head of the
provisional Algerian government. In the same month the OAS made an
unsuccessful attempt on de Gaulle's life as its activities increased
throughout France and Algeria, with rumors of the proclamation of a
dissident French republic under General Salan in northern Algeria.
The first secret negotiations held at Melun in June were a failure,
but after discussions between de Gaulle and Bourguiba, between FLN
leaders and Georges Pompidou (then a private banker) and between the
FLN and Moroccans, Tunisians and Egyptians, a conference was called at
Evian in Switzerland .The problems were the FLN's claim to be
recognized as a government, the right of the imprisoned Ben Bella to
attend the conference, guarantees for the French who might wish to
remain in Algeria, continuing French rights in the naval base at Mers-
el-Kebir, Saharan oil, and the conditions under which the proposed
referendum on the status of Algeria would be held.
Negotiations were opened in France with representatives of the
Algerian provisional government ( GPRA) in May 1961. GPRA had long
been recognized by the Arab and communist states, from which it
received aid, though it (communism) was never been able to establish
itself on Algerian soil. Negotiations were broken off in July, after
which Abbas was replaced as premier by the much younger Ben Youssef
Ben Khedda. Settler opposition around the OAS began to employ random
acts of terror to disrupt peace negotiations.
The second Evian conference took place in March 1962. On March 18, a
ceasefire agreement was signed. The conference also agreed on the
terms for the referendum and presuming that the result would favor
independence, further agreed (among other things), that French troops
would be withdrawn progressively over three years, except from Mers-el-
Kebir. France might continue its nuclear tests in the Sahara and
retain its airfields there for five years and would continue its
economic activities in the Saharan oilfields. France also agreed to
continue technical and financial aid to Algeria for at least three
years.
This announcement produced a violent outburst of OAS terrorism, but in
May it subsided as it became obvious that such actions were futile. A
referendum held in Algeria in July 1962 recorded some 6 million votes
in favor of independence and only 16,000 against it. After three days
of continuous Algerian rejoicing, the GPRA entered Algiers in triumph,
as settler Europeans began to depart.
Algeria becomes Independent
On July 3, 1962 Algeria became an independent sovereign state. But its
leaders could not remain together. Ben Bella returned to Algiers after
six years' absence in prison and joined hands with army chief Colonel
Houari Boumedienne to become the first president . But perhaps he
alienated colleagues and followers by trying to reorganize the FLN on
communist lines and playing a leading role in African and Afro-Asian
affairs to the neglect of urgent domestic problems. In June 1965 Ben
Bella tried to sideline conservative Boumedienne, now defense
minister, but was himself overthrown, with the latter becoming the
president. Ben Bella was imprisoned until 1978 and remained under
house arrest until 1990. But Algeria remains a violent place and in
the bloody confrontation between FLN/army and radical Islamic groups
100,000 Algerians were killed during the 1990s.
Civil wars and Turkey's war of Independence
After the Allied powers' victory in World War 1, the Ottoman
government in Istanbul under the 36th and last Ottoman Sultan Caliph
Mehmed VI Vahideddin (1918-22) decided that resistance to Allied
demands was futile, but there remained many pockets of resistance in
Anatolia. These consisted of bands of irregulars and deserters, a
number of intact Ottoman units and various societies for the "defense
of rights".
At this time, Mustafa Kemal (he became Ataturk "Father of Turks"
later ), a hero of the Gallipoli front in the war was sent as
Inspector of the army to eastern Turkey. Landing at Samsun on May 19,
1919, he immediately began to organize resistance and was soon joined
by other military leaders like Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Kasim Karabekir, Ruaf
Orbay, Refet Bele and others with their troops. The Association for
the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia was founded and a
congress at Erzurum (July-August) summoned. It was followed by a
second congress at Sivas with delegates representing the whole
country. A new Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia
and Rumelia elected Mustafa Kemal as the chairman of its executive
committee to organize national resistance.
But the fire of resistance really flared up when the hated Greeks,
with British encouragement, occupied Izmir (May 15, 1919). The Allied
plans imposed in the Treaty of Sevres, which the Ottoman
representative signed, would have created an independent Armenia, an
autonomous Kurdish region, demilitarization and international control
over the Straits and Istanbul, with the rest of the country parceled
to the Greeks, the French and the Italians. Only a barren northeast
rump of Anatolia would have remained with the Turks.
Negotiations were arranged between the Istanbul government and the
Kemalists. A new parliament was elected, which met in Istanbul in
January 1920. Kemal was against the meeting in Istanbul and stayed
back in Ankara. The new parliament passed the National Pact,
formulated at Erzurum and Sivas, which called for independence roughly
within the October 1918 armistice lines. In response the Allies
enlarged the area of occupation in Istanbul (March 16, 1920), arrested
and de****ted many deputies and set out to crush the Kemalists. Most
deputies escaped to Ankara and the die was cast.
To establish a legitimate basis of action the Grand National Assembly
(parliament) met at Ankara on April 23 and asserted that the Sultan's
government was under infidel control. It was the duty of Muslims to
resist foreign encroachment. In the Fundamental Law of January 20,
1921, the assembly declared that sovereignty belonged to the nation
and that the assembly was the "true and only representative of the
nation". The name of the state was declared to be Turkey, and
executive power was entrusted to an executive council, headed by
Mustafa Kemal, who could now concentrate on the war of independence.
Soon the Kemalists were faced with local uprisings, official Ottoman
forces and Greek hostility sup****ted by the Allies.
In response to the declarations of the Grand National Assembly in
Ankara, the Istanbul government appointed its own extraordinary
Anatolian general inspector and a new Security Army, later called the
Caliphal Army, in 1920 to enforce its rule and fight the nationalists
with British sup****t. The Istanbul and Ankara governments issued
fatwas against each other, specially against Kemal. Thus the stage was
set for a full civil war. The situation was similar to the chaos in
Anatolia in the early 15th century after Bayezit's defeat by
Tamerlane, when rival Ottoman governments in Europe and Ankara
contested control over Anatolia. The empire was threatened by foreign
invasion and the land was infested by local rebellions and roaming
bands. And in both cases it was the heartland of Turkish life and
tradition, Anatolia, that produced the victor.
In this chaotic and lawless situation, many bands rose to seek wealth
and power for themselves, in alliance with one or the other of the
governments, sometimes at the instigation of the Greeks, the British,
or even the communists. Sometimes the bands represented large
landowners who were seeking to regain their power. Most degenerated
into little more than bandit forces, manned by a motley assortment of
dispossessed peasants, Tatars from the Crimea and Central Asia and
Turkish and Kurdish nomads, always ready for a good fight against
whoever was in power. These armies became so powerful that on April
29, 1920, the Grand National Assembly passed a law that prohibited
"crimes against the nation" and set up independence courts (Istiklal
Mahkemeleri) to try and execute on the spot. These courts became a
major instrument of the Ankara government to suppress opposition long
after independence was achieved.
Most famous of the private armies operating in Anatolia during the
civil war was the Green Army (Yesil Ordu), which posed a major threat
to all sides. It was organized during the winter of 1920 "to evict
from Asia the penetration and occupation of European imperialism". Its
members were former unionists, known to and respected by Mustafa
Kemal, including its secretary general, Hakki Behic, Bey and Yunus
Nadi, an influential Istanbul journalist, whose journal Yeni Gun (New
Day) had just been closed by the British. Nadi in 1924 founded the
leading newspaper of republican Turkey, ***huriyet (The Republic). Its
objective was to counter the reactionary propaganda spread in Anatolia
by agents of the Istanbul government and the Allies and to popularize
the national movement and mobilize the Turkish peasants' sup****t.
So the Green Army was sup****ted and encouraged by Kemal. But many of
its members wished to combine unionism, Pan-Islam and socialism and
"establish a socialist union in the world of Islam by modifying the
Russian Revolution". Soon it attracted a number of groups opposed to
the Ankara government, including not only sup****ters of the Istanbul
government but also anti-Kemalist unionists and communists connected
with the Third International. This led Kemal to get Hakki Behic to
disband the organization late in 1920, though its various anti-
Kemalist elements continued to act on their own during the next two
years.
There were two other independent armies, both led by Circassians,
which were very active. They were mostly formed of Tatar and
Circassian refugees driven into Anatolia by the Russians. A left-
leaning guerrilla movement led by Cerkes Ethem was at first quite
successful against the Greeks near Izmir in 1919. It sup****ted the
national movement for some time against the reactionary Caliphal army
and the anti-Ankara movements that were active in the eastern Marmara
region in 1920.
The other Circassian, Ahmet Anzavur, led a more conservative movement
and force with money and arms provided by the Istanbul government and
the British. He led two major revolts against the nationalists in the
areas of Baliksir and Gonen in October-December 1919 and again from
February to June 1920. For a time he even led the Caliphal army and
his bands began to ravage the countryside. Kemal chose Cerkes Ethem,
who was still with him to defeat and send Aznur on the run in April
1920. Anzavur soon raised a new army, but was defeated and killed and
his army dispersed by the nationalists in May, 1920.
Ultimately, Cerkes Ethem became too big for his boots and increasingly
rapacious towards the civilian population, Muslim and non-Muslim
alike. He had allied with the Green Army, sometimes he sup****ted
various communist manifestos being circulated. And he was not inclined
to follow Ankara's plans so essential for the success of the new
nationalist army being raised. Finally, Kemal sent a major force to
destroy Cerkes Ethem's army in January 1921, forcing him to flee to
the Greeks and eventually to Italy into exile.
There were also strong local rebellions around Bolu, Yozgat, and
Duzce, (halfway between Ankara and Istanbul). The last was led by the
Capanoglu Derebey family, which tried to restore its old power. He and
his followers were hunted down and dispersed by the nationalists. Its
leading members were hanged in Amasya in August 1920. Such movements
and revolts did not subside, even after the establishment of the
republic. It took time to reduce the old family and tribal forces that
were revived by the civil wars.
And finally there were the communists, with Russia sending propaganda
literature into Anatolia. Kemal was opposed in principle but took
little action initially as he needed the Bolsheviks' help. He even
tolerated a number of communist activities during 1920, including a
new joint communist-unionist organization in Ankara called the
People's Communist Party (Tiirkiye Halk Istirakiyun Firkasi), which
enabled the communists to come out publicly in Turkey for the first
time.
It had some connection with the Green Army. On October 18, 1920, to
please the Russians, Ataturk even allowed the formation of a separate
Turkish Communist Party (Tiirkiye Komiinist Firkasi). But it was
manned mainly by some of his close associates from the assembly. It
was less radical than the first group and was used by the government
as a tool to divide and confuse the communist movement and its
sup****ters.
But when the former became too active it was suppressed. It had issued
a joint declaration with the Green Army and Cerkes Ethem that they had
"approved the Bolshevik party program passed by the Third
International ... and joined to unite all the social revolutionary
movements in the country", and adopted the name Turkish People's
Collectivist Bolshevik Party. Communist agents became active around
Ankara and Eskisehir and cooperated with unionist groups in Erzurum
and Trabzon, which were centers of Enver Pasha's sup****ters throughout
the war for independence.
This forced Ataturk to criticize the communists for working outside
the organ of the people, the Grand National Assembly. After cru****ng
the Green Army and chasing out Cerkes Ethem, he now turned on the
communists. Their leaders were tried, but the final sentences were
suspended until after a treaty was signed with Moscow in March 1921.
As Russian sup****t was im****tant, the sentences were relatively light.
The only violent action against the Turkish communists came when
communist Mustafa Suphi and others entered Anatolia via Kars in
December 1920. Though they met with top nationalist leaders like Ali
Fuat and Kazim Karabekir at Kars in January 1921, they were arrested
soon and sent by boat to Erzurum for trial. On the way they were
assassinated by a group of pro-Enver sup****ters from Trabzon,
apparently because of the fear that Suphi might expose Enver's plans.
As for the da****ng Enver Pasha and his colleagues Cemal and Talat, who
had led the Ottoman empire into World War 1, they fled from Istanbul
on November 2, 1918, on a German freighter going to Odessa. Then they
went over to Berlin, but lived under assumed names, since the victors
had demanded their extradition for the "crimes" of their regime. Soon
they were invited by Karl Radek to continue their work in Moscow, with
full Bolshevik sup****t for the "Turkish national struggle". Talat, who
remained in Germany, was killed by an Armenian assassin on March 15,
1921. Cemal and Enver went to Moscow and later to Central Asia, where
they undertook a series of political activities with the ultimate
intention of using the Bolsheviks to regain power in Turkey once the
nationalists were defeated.
With Bolshevik encouragement, Enver proclaimed the organization of the
Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (Islam Ihtilal Cemiyetleri
Ittihadi) and an affiliated Party of People's Councils (Halk 'uralar
Firkasi), the former as the international Muslim revolutionary
organization, the latter as its Turkish branch.
In early September 1920, he attended the Congress of the Peoples of
the East at Baku. But while Ataturk generally encouraged Enver, hoping
to use him to get Bolshevik aid, he never trusted him. Enver had some
groups of sup****ters in Anatolia, including about 40 secret unionists
in the assembly, working to install Enver in Ataturk's place at an
op****tune moment. Enver moved from Moscow to Batum in the summer of
1921 when the Greek offensive began, hoping to enter Anatolia if
Ataturk nationalist forces were defeated. But following Kemal's
victory over the Greeks at Sakarya (September 1921), Enver abandoned
Turkey and went into Central Asia to lead its Muslims against both the
British and the Russians. He was killed in a battle with Russian
forces near Ceken while pursuing his pan-Turanian mission.
What was the role of the Sultan in the conflict? According to Sir
Horace Rumbold, British ambassador in Istanbul, the Sultan did not
understand the nationalists or their movement. He thought a handful of
brigands had established complete ascendancy and stranglehold on the
people as a whole. The Ankara leaders were men without any real stake
in the country, with which they had no connection of blood or anything
else. Kemal was a Macedonian revolutionary of unknown origins. Bekir
Sami was a Circassian. They were all the same, Albanians, Circassians,
anything but Turks. There was not a real Turk among them. The real
Turks were loyal to the Sultan, who had been hoodwinked by fantastic
misrepresentations, like his own captivity. They looked for external
sup****t and found it in the Bolsheviks. The Angora leaders might
discover and regret too late that they would bring on Turkey the fate
of Azerbaijan.(which was taken over by the Bolsheviks).
In the meantime, Kemal organized his national army to fight for
Anatolia's independence, trained, disciplined and armed at a new
officers' school established in Ankara. Russian arms and ammunition
began to flow across the Black Sea in increasing amounts. In Istanbul
after the Allied occupation a new and well-spread group was organized
among the remaining civil servants and officers and called the
National Defense Organization (Mudafaa-i Milliye Tefkildtt) to send
information, arms and equipment to the nationalists.
During 1920-1921, the Greeks had made major advances, almost to
Ankara, but were defeated at the Battle of the Sakarya River (August
24, 1921) and began a long and hasty retreat that ended in the Turks
regaining Izmir (September 9, 1922) and the expulsion of Greek forces
from Anatolia. The total dead in the war was; for Turks, 10,000 dead
in fighting and 22,000 from disease. Greek dead and wounded were
estimated at 100,000. During World War 1, with the front with Russian
forces ****fting in northeast Anatolia where Armenians were encouraged
and hopeful of an independent state, terrible killings took place
involving all sides. It continued even after wars. In the World War
580,000 Ottoman soldiers died, half from disease. Turkish official
history calculates that 300,000 Armenians were killed. An Ottoman war
crimes tribunal set up by the victors gives a figure of 800,000. But
Armenian historians allege that 1.5 million died, practically the
entire Armenian population in Anatolia.
The Kemalists had already begun to gain European recognition. On March
16, 1921, the Soviet-Turkish Treaty gave Turkey a favorable settlement
of its eastern frontier by restoring Kars and Ardahan. Problems at
home induced Italy to withdraw from the territory it occupied; and by
the Treaty of Ankara (Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, October 20, 1921),
France agreed to evacuate Cilicia (Adana region). Finally, by the
Armistice of Mudanya, the Allies agreed to Turkish reoccupation of
Istanbul and eastern Thrace.
A comprehensive settlement was eventually achieved at the Lausanne
Conference (November 1922 - July 1923) which negated the Treaty of
Sevres. The Turkish frontier in Thrace was established on the Maritsa
River and Greece returned the islands of Gokge and Bozca. A compulsory
exchange of populations was arranged, as a result of which an
estimated 1,300,000 Greeks left Turkey in return for 400,000 Turks.
The question of oil rich Mosul was left to the League of Nations,
which in 1925 recommended its retention by Iraq. But Turks have never
been reconciled to the loss of Mosul. The Lausanne Treaty also
provided for the ap****tionment of the Ottoman public debt, for the
gradual abolition of the Capitulations (Turkey regained tariff
autonomy in 1929), and for an international regime for the Straits.
Turkey recovered complete control of the Straits by the 1936 Montreux
Convention.
On October 29, 1923, Turkey was declared to be a republic and elected
Mustafa Kemal as its first president. The Caliphate was finally
abolished on March 3, 1924, and all members of the Ottoman dynasty
were expelled from Turkey. A full republican constitution was adopted
on April 20, 1924; it retained Islam as the state religion, but in
April 1928 this clause was removed and Turkey became a laic (secular)
republic.
K Gajendra Singh, Indian ambassador (retired), served as ambassador to
Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996. Prior to that, he served terms
as ambassador to Jordan, Romania and Senegal. He is currently chairman
of the Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies. Email
Gajendrak@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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