On Jul 17, 2:57 am, John Holmes <jhol...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> So how does this prove that the Mandelites like Krivine scabbed on the
> Algerians, thereby driving an angry Pablo to join the French
> government?
>
> -jh-
>
> On Wed, 16 Jul 2008, Vngelis wrote:
> > France 1956-62
> > Alain Krivine and Algeria
>
> > Source: Jacques Charby, Les ****teurs d=92Espoir. La D=E9couverte,
Paris=
,
> > 2004;
> > Translated: for marxists.org by Mitch Abidor.
>
> > Alain Krivine, one of the best-known figures in post-war French
> > Trotskyism, began his political life as a young Communist militant. It
> > was in that capacity that he was sent to the World Youth Conference in
> > Moscow in 1957, where he met with representatives of the Algerian FLN.
> > This meeting was to be the turning point in his political life.
>
> > When I returned to France, if I hadn=92t totally broken with the
Party,
> > I was at least scandalized by its attitude. From that point on I took
> > the decision to aid the FLN and to talk about it with those around me,
> > considering that it was absolutely necessary to =93do something.=94
But=
I
> > didn=92t know how to make contact. And it was here that family
relation=
s
> > intervened: I had brothers who had been aiding the FLN for a long
> > time. They weren=92t Stalinists and they had hidden their activities
> > from me since I was a [little] =93Stalinist leader.=94 But seeing how
> > unhappy I was to not be able to do anything for Algeria they
> > intervened, telling me that perhaps we could help the Algerians.
>
> > So they put me in contact with the group Jeune R=E9sistance (Young
> > Resistance), through which I began my sup****t activities. Within the
> > framework of the Communist Youth (JC) I had begun to carry on a fight
> > for the Algerians, notably demanding that Mme Audin [1] be invited to
> > a meeting of the JC. They answered me: =93You=92re nuts. We=92re not
go=
ing
> > to invite her to a meeting.=94 Just to finish off these stories, which
> > show pretty clearly the mind set of the party, the JC had distributed
> > a tract that invited people, on the occasion of a student congress, to
> > a dance =93For peace in Algeria.=94 The words: =93We=92ll dance and
we=
=92ll...=94
> > were added to it. I was a delegate to the National Congress. Still
> > na=EFve I went up to the tribune to declare that we didn=92t seem to
be
> > aware of the situation, that there were people who were dying there
> > and that I thought it disgusting that we would allow these kinds of
> > festivities on the subject of Algeria. Everyone started to chant:
> > =93Virgin, Virgin...=94
>
> > So I found myself in a network that was led by Trotskyists. My
> > brothers were Trotskyists and of course they hadn=92t told me this,
> > since as a good Stalinist I hated the Trotskyists. The first question
> > I asked one of them was: =93I agree to join into your Jeune
R=E9sistanc=
e
> > network, but only on condition that there not be any Trots there!=94
He
> > asked me why I said this and I answered: =93Because they=92re cops,
and=
I
> > know that in this kind of thing there are Trotskyists.=94 He assured
me
> > that there weren=92t any and asked me what I had against Trotsky.
> > =93Nothing! All I know is that he was a cop and a fascist!=94
>
> > So I worked with Jeune R=E9sistance, which above all worked at
stopping
> > the trains of draftees. Then I went into the Union des =E9tudiants
> > communistes (UEC), where I was a member of the leader****p, while
> > clandestinely being a member of Jeune R=E9sistance. During
> > demonstrations we tried to start up chants for independence and to
> > wave FLN flags, while the rest shouted =93Peace in Algeria!=94 There
wa=
s
> > also activity within the army; this is what most interested me. So
> > there was the stoppage of trains of soldiers who were leaving. Signals
> > were sabotaged. In this way we stopped dozens of trains, and this made
> > a lot of noise.
>
> > During the greatest part of the war the Party had as its slogan
=93Peac=
e
> > in Algeria,=94 and its instructions were not to have relations with
the
> > Algerians, which would have been too dangerous for the Party. When the
> > hierarchy found members sup****ting the FLN they were expelled. A
> > comrade from Billancourt who aided the FLN, who we called
=93Benoit,=94
> > was immediately chased out of the Party (in fact, he was a clandestine
> > Trotskyist). The Party was also equally opposed to desertion and
> > insubordination. It explained that a young Communist should go into
> > the army, but following Lenin=92s schema, in order to introduce
> > revolutionary ideas there. Nevertheless, the PCF didn=92t organize the
> > draftees at all, and none of the young Communists who went had any
> > instructions. Unfortunately, many of them became racists, since there
> > was no counterweight to the ideological pressures of military life.
>
> > So the PCF opposed all initiatives. It was completely against the
> > stopping of trains, the sabotage against =93our comrade railroad
> > workers.=94 The movement had considerably developed, since we were as
> > many as 900 in Jeune R=E9sistance, which is a lot for a clandestine
> > organization (in a way it was the beginning of the extreme Left).
> > Young Communists refused to be insubordinate for fear of going to
> > prison... There were some sons of members of the Central Committee who
> > carried out courageous actions, but it was too late. The leader****p of
> > the PC had its few martyrs in order to later say to the Algerians and
> > public opinion =93Our Party, too, had its martyrs.=94 So in the last
tw=
o
> > years of the war about 20 young Communist soldiers refused to be sent
> > to Algeria. But when you look at their names it was often the sons of
> > leaders, like the son of L=E9andre Letocard, or of members of the
> > Central Committee who did refuse to go to Algeria and were sent to
> > prison. But this was at the end. In 1956 Alban Liechti was the first
> > to refuse to go to Algeria, but the Party didn=92t sup****t him: he was
> > absolutely alone [2].
>
> > My two brothers were directly involved in the sup****t networks, in
> > liaison with the Federation de France of the FLN. They handled the
> > trans****ting of money. From time to time I gave them some help. For
> > the most part I took care of trans****ts in Paris: when cars full of
> > cops closed off certain neighborhoods you had to put people at the
> > intersections to be sure there weren=92t any checkpoints set up. Our
> > pals gave us signals permitting cars trans****ting FLN militants to
> > cross Paris without hindrance. I did this many times.
>
> > And then we took =93initiatives=94 concerning prisons. Notably, I
> > participated in an attempt to liberate some women. This was at
> > Fresnes. A group of comrades had flown over the prison with a small
> > plane, which was prohibited, and had taken some pictures. By the way,
> > they were sick as dogs in the plane, which had had to perform aerial
> > acrobatics. As for me, at night I was in the arms of a charming
> > comrade, and we kept track of the changing of the guard among the
> > police and the CRS around the prison in order to learn their
> > itinerary, how may they were, and when the guard was changed.
>
> > We were right up against the walls. Little hills permitted us to hide.
> > We were a few couples who relieved each other, each couple remaining
> > there four and a half hours.
>
> > We transmitted the information to people who had pseudonyms, and whose
> > identity I don=92t know. They were at =93a higher level.=94 It was
pret=
ty
> > well organized. The networks were a good school. Some participated for
> > =93humanist=94 reasons, because they were scandalized by the torture
of
> > Algerians. This is both good and normal. But for others these networks
> > were a good political school. The became true internationalists. They
> > acquired a form of political practice, which is always useful.
> > Afterwards, in political organizations, we realized that a good part
> > of the nucleus of the future extreme Left had its origins in the aid
> > to the Algerian revolution. It was a matter of =93practical=94
> > internationalism, and not one of discourse. It could concretely be
> > seen how a revolution inspires sympathy, politicizes young people, and
> > makes militants of them. This was truly a school of practical labor.
>
> > The attitude of the leader****p and the Communist students in relation
> > to the war in Algeria was to be one of the reasons for the opposition
> > that was born and exploded among them. Algeria, along with Hungary,
> > are the two elements of the crisis; the betrayal of the Algeria people
> > by the PCF and the sup****t given by the latter during the Soviet
> > invasion of Hungary, which was also considered a treason, that of a
> > the Hungarian people. The =93clandestine=94 militants in solidarity
wit=
h
> > Algeria, who were members of the UEC, were to play a very im****tant
> > role in the birth of a =93Left Opposition=94 to Stalinism. This
opposit=
ion
> > was to be born beginning in 1960-61 and would end with the expulsion
> > of all of them in 1965. The transition was nevertheless to take five
> > years. Before the war in Algeria was to end, the OAS affair was to be
> > a supplementary element in nouri****ng, feeding and radicalizing a
> > ****tion of the Young Communists, including in =93practical labor.=94
>
> > All of these elements were to contribute to our radicalization, but in
> > contradictory ways. So when it came to the army, in principle I was
> > attached to the Leninist tradition, i.e., that it was necessary to go
> > into the army and fight there by denouncing colonialism. I admired
> > those few soldiers who went over to the other side, lock, stock and
> > barrel. For me, as I was beginning to de-Stalinize myself, the hero
> > was officer cadet Maillot. What he did was like the =93mutineers of
the
> > Black Sea=94 with Andr=E9 Marty: =93We are in solidarity with the
revol=
ution
> > on the other side. We join them with our arms, we=92re joining the
othe=
r
> > side.=94 The enemy was French colonialism. Maillot and Iveton [3]were
> > truly heroes: the act of solidarity was capital.
>
> > Knowing that the PCF was doing nothing, in the army we completely
> > sup****ted insubordination and desertion. This allowed
>
> ...
>
> read more =BB
The honour of the French left was restored by Pablos activities in
sup****t of the Algerian revolution from the early 1950's. He faced
stiff opposition both from the French chauvinists inside the left and
the left zionists inside the movement. The remnants of those policies
are still dictating the terms of historical reference.
Evidence of the matter is that
a) Walters runs MIA and has no historical clue about what happened in
France during this period
b) you have no clue
c) Einde, lets just say forget it there
What happened to Pablo in the 1960's was in direct pro****tion in
reverse to what he did in the 1950's, much in the same way that
Thornetts reaction to the negative aspect of Healyism drove him
eventually to the ranks of Labourism.
The problem wasn't Pablo in the 1960's per se but the trotskyist
movement post war in France and its relation****p with its own colonies
which had more close links with the tradition of stalinism than to
bolshevism.
The French CP was in government during the anti-colonial revolutions
in french indochina and it did next to nothing for the struggle for
Algerian independence...
Now specifically what actually happened and what the Mandelites did
isn't for a medium such as this.
vngelis
|
