IMHO SHA1 was not broken but there was found an algorithm to find a
partially strong collision by Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin and Hongbo Yu.
ha****ng is no component of symmetric encryption but for signing their
content (not needed if there would be no open channel to modify content
without having secret key). As far as i know signing is not used when
encrypting symmetric, because there exist no public key for faking and
encrypting content. Otherwise if you do not encrypt your disc space or
letting an open chanel to modify during a session you can "protect" it
with
the signature, which you encrypt with your own public key, so that an
attacker cannot get the old hash value and he does not know how to inject
malicious content.On the other hand, the content is hashed over the whole
space. I don't know how it is implemented but intuitively I think that's a
chain of signatures where each part is a signature over old signature and
added content. I think a bigger problem is an open channel during the
session. ... I don't think, that SHA1 is a vulnerable or desired thankful
goal. But SHA-1 is deprecated and discontinued. Recommended (at least in
germany) are at least RIPEMD-160 or SHA-512. Greetz
"Casper" <spam@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> schrieb im Newsbeitrag
news:mn.10437d82e63084f4.86807@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> PGP whole disk encryption uses SHA1 for ha****ng, which
> seems to be a broken or half broken algorythm, depending
> who you ask.
>
> Anyone knows if the fact that PGP whole disk encryption
> uses SHA1 for ha****ng (AES for encryption) makes it
> much more vulnerable to attack?
>
>
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