Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism in Turkey highest
since Islamist PM Erdogan (AKP) took office in Ankara:
http://www.wa****ngtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=304
"
Is There a Clash of Civilizations?
Islam, Democracy, and U.S.-Middle East Policy
Featuring Soner Cagaptay, September 14, 2006
House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee
on the Middle East and Central Asia
On September 14, 2006, Soner Cagaptay testified before the House
International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle
East and Central Asia's hearing on Islam, democracy, and U.S.
policy toward the Middle East. The following is the prepared
text of his remarks:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the
op****tunity to appear before you today. I am submitting my full
testimony for the record and will summarize my statement. In
discussing the question of a clash of civilizations between the
West and Muslim countries, I would like to elaborate on Turkey's
recent drift away from the West.
In the post September 11 world, as a secular democracy deeply
entrenched in Western institutions, Turkey emerged as a pivotal
country in debunking the argument of a clash of civilizations.
Yet, my recent observations lead me to believe that Turkey's
unique position as a country anchored in the Western world is
being challenged. The rise of the Islamist Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government in November 2002 is a
milestone in this process. Hence, I would like to focus my
discussion today on the gap that has emerged between Turkey and
the West since the AKP's rise to power.
Turkey's foreign policy orientation before the AKP
Until November 2002, Turkish foreign policy was quite predictable.
Ankara cooperated enthusiastically with Wa****ngton, whether in
the Middle East or in the Balkans. Turkey aligned itself with
Israel and kept at arms length from Middle Eastern neighbors
such as Syria and Iran. On the European front, Ankara pursued an
aggressive policy of European Union (EU) accession.
Turkey's foreign policy orientation since the AKP's rise
Today, though, the picture looks much different. U.S.-Turkish relations
are strained on almost all Middle East issues. From their views
of terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to dealing with
Iran and Syria, the US and Turkey have developed vastly
disparate positions since the AKP's rise to power
How did we get here? In the runup to the Iraq War in March 2003,
the AKP-controlled parliament in Ankara refused to allow the
creation of a northern front. After that, the AKP took issue
with the Iraq War, and sharply criticized U.S. policies in Iraq.
Later on, the AKP castigated other U.S. policies in the Middle
East. The AKP's anti-American rhetoric has caused a ****ft in
Turkish public opinion towards the United States, while the
party has pursued rapprochement with Muslim states in the Middle
East. Accordingly, Turkish and American views of the region have
diverged significantly.
For instance, while the U.S. has aimed to isolate Syria
internationally, Turkey has pursued a policy of rapprochement
with Damascus. Relations between Ankara and Damascus have
improved noticeably since 2002 with the help of high-level
visits. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul and prime minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan have visited Damascus numerous times. In
return, Syrian foreign minister Farouq al-Shara and prime
minister Mohammed Mustafa Miro have visited Ankara. The most
im****tant visit encapsulating the rapprochement between Ankara
and Damascus was Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's January 2004
trip to Turkey. Whereas only a few years ago, Turkey viewed
Syria as an enemy country due to Damascus's sup****t for the
terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the AKP showered Asad
with praise. Before leaving Ankara, Asad summarized his
successful trip to Turkish network CNN-Turk: "We have moved
together from an atmosphere of distrust to trust."
Relations between Turkey and Iran have also improved noticeably
since the AKP's rise. During 2003, for instance, four high-level
visits took place from Turkey to Iran (two by Turkish foreign
minister Gul), and six from Iran to Turkey, including one by
Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi. Since 2003, Iran has
claimed to be cracking down on PKK terrorists within its
borders, Ankara's most pressing concern. Advances were also seen
in the cultural sphere. A December 2003 treaty on educational
cooperation between Turkey and Iran creates mechanisms for
Turkish students to study in Iran, provides for reciprocal
scholar****ps and facilitates the sharing of curricula between
the two countries (a difficult endeavor, given that Turkey has a
secular education system whereas Iran does not). Although lately
there have been signs that Turkey sup****ts the European
initiative to block Iran's nuclearization, enhanced ties between
Ankara and Tehran make it very hard to believe that the AKP
government would ever, for instance, join international
sanctions against Tehran, let alone take part in aggressive
action to challenge Iran's nuclearization.
While the AKP has pursued a policy of rapprochement with Syria
and Iran, Turkish attitudes toward the United States have soured
significantly. Four years of harsh criticism of American foreign
policy in the Middle East-U.S. military incursions into Fallujah
in 2004, for example, were officially called a "genocide" in
Turkey-have created what could be a permanent dent in public
opinion. Whereas in the pre-AKP period typically more than half
of Turks expressed favorable views of the U.S., a June Pew
Center survey showed that only 12 percent of Turks view America
positively. In that study, the United States is favored worse in
Turkey than in Egypt or Jordan.
Some of the blame lies with Wa****ngton. America's unwillingness
to take action against the terrorist PKK in northern Iraq is a
source of frustration. Lately, Turkish casualties resulting from
PKK attacks have been mounting at a rate close to that
experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq. The civilian carnage in Iraq
itself has added to the Turkish frustration.
Yet, there is something peculiar about anti-Americanism in
Turkey under the AKP. Whereas in the pre-AKP period the Turks
were America's best friends in the Muslim world, today they have
the least favorable opinions of the United States.
The AKP is also alienating Turkey's other traditional ally in
the region, Israel. A good example came earlier this year when
Erdogan invited the leader of Hamas's military wing, Khaled
Mashal, to Ankara, despite criticism from the West and
pro-Western Turks. The AKP continues to defend the visit, keeps
contacts with Mashal, and opposes Western efforts to isolate
Hamas.
Mr. Chairman, the AKP's alternative is the Muslim Middle East.
The party has demonstrated an intense and bizarre interest in
all "Muslim causes." Last month, at the onset of the
Israel-Hizballah war, Erdogan lambasted Israel for trying to
"wipe out the Palestinians" in Lebanon. On the same day, a PKK
terror attack killed five Turkish soldiers. But Erdogan failed
to mention the PKK in his speech. Erdogan's foreign policy gives
the impression that Muslim causes are more im****tant than
Turkish ones.
The AKP's change of tone on the Mideast isn't without
consequences. The Turkish media have run virulently anti-Semitic
articles-a dreadful development in a country that has prided
itself on saving Jews who fled the Spanish Inquisition as well
as the Nazis. A recent anti-Israel demonstration in Istanbul
attracted around 100,000 people. Before the AKP, anti-Israeli
protests would have drawn just a few hundred diehard jihadists.
Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier, the AKP challenges
Turkey's Western orientation not only through its foreign policy
initiatives, but also through its words. The party leader****p
almost always describes regional issues in the Middle East as
religious and cultural conflicts, shaping Turkish public
attitudes on such issues through the prism of a clash of
civilizations.
For instance, AKP leader Erdogan has more than once
characterized the Israel-Hezbollah war as a religious conflict,
stating that "mothers and sons are being martyred in Lebanon."
Such rhetoric suits more the year 1099 and the Crusades than
Turkey, which is negotiating entry into Europe today.
In another incident, in 2005 Erdogan spoke at the Arab League
summit in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, saying "The West uses
terrorism to sell us weapons." Such remarks show where Erdogan
thinks Turkey belongs-not in the West, but strangely enough, in
the Arab world. (The Arab countries showed a better sense of
national identity vis-à-vis Erdogan: they turned down Turkey's
application to join the Arab League, saying Turkey is not an
Arab country).
Why does the AKP pursue such policies? If Islamist ideology
constitutes one part of the party's foreign policy calculus,
domestic aspirations are another. The AKP's conundrum is that it
is not sup****ted by a majority of Turks, and the party has
therefore used a populist foreign policy that bashes the West to
boost its domestic standing.
This is working: Not only are Turkish attitudes toward the
United States spoiling, but the AKP now draws broad domestic
sup****t from its foreign policy. If Turks think of themselves as
Muslims first in the foreign policy arena, then one day they'll
think of themselves as Muslims first in the domestic one. A
telltale sign of the growth of Islamist sentiments is the surge
in Islamist media. In the last four years, Islamist newspapers
have boomed in Turkey. Combined circulation figures for the
Islamist press have almost tripled to more than 1.1 million
today from 441,200 in 2001. Another alarming sign is changing
Turkish attitudes toward the Christian faith. According to the
June Pew Center re****t, today only 15 percent of the Turks have
favorable opinions of Christians.
Mr. Chairman, some policy realists may suggest that Turkey's
ongoing drift away from the West is an internal matter and that
it is more im****tant to promote a short-term AKP commitment to
Wa****ngton's policy objectives in the region, such as
encountering Iran's nuclearization. This does not seem viable.
Here is why.
Recently, Turkey approved a motion to send peacekeepers to
Lebanon. In demonstrating how far Turkey has drifted away from
the West and toward the Muslim world, Erdogan countered public
objections to sending peacekeepers to Lebanon, saying that
"Turkey would neither disarm nor harm Hezbollah." With that
promise, the Turkish parliament approved sending peacekeepers to
Lebanon. If the AKP's Turkey needs to be convinced to take part
in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon only on the condition that
Hezbollah will not be confronted, how will the same government
ever join any action against Iran? And let's not ignore the fact
that according to a recent German Marshall Fund survey, under
the AKP, Turks have come to like Iran more than they like the
United States: Today 43 percent of Turks have a favorable
opinion of Iran. This means that for every Turk who likes the
United States, there are three Turks who like Iran.
The AKP experience in Turkey shows that, once in government,
Islamist parties bring about change in unexpected ways. The
AKP's foreign policy is scratching away the Turks' sense of
national identity, while infusing Turkish society with a strong
sense of Muslim nationalism. In the rift between the West and
the Muslim world, Turkey is fast approaching the tipping point
at which "the cat will not walk back." Whether this
transformation continues depends on if the United States takes
the right steps to address Turkey's most serious concern in
bilateral ties: the PKK in northern Iraq. There is some promise
in this regard: Wa****ngton has recently prioritized the PKK
issue with the appointment of a special envoy, Gen. Joseph
Ralston, to discuss cooperation against the PKK. A second factor
that will determine Turkey's future is the Turkish elections of
2007. Will secular, Western-minded Turks, long unable to provide
a captivating political message, successfully challenge the AKP,
and will the United States sup****t such an initiative? If not, a
second AKP government might well turn Turkey into an
unrecognizable country-somehow democratic, superficially
secular, and definitely not Western.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at The Wa****ngton Institute
and chair of the Turkey Program at the State Department's
Foreign Service Institute.
"
--
ATTENTION !
One never can trust an Islamist like Erdogan & Co !
Because they mostly practice taqiyya ! (ie. lying !).
You might wonder why pious religious people would do such a shameful act.
Ha ha! You don't know Islam and its "holy" book Koran! Look:
Islam has a built-in "lying for the case of Islam is permitted" in its
'bible' (ie. the Koran).
It's called "al-Taqiyya". If you still don't believe then just read this
paper:
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.religion.islam/msg/87bd60bd8f05243c
So, be careful when dealing with any Islamist... :-)
America must change its Turkey policy; you cannot trust the Islamist AKP
party.
The Islamists have built a gigantic propaganda media (see above text)
to practice, guess what, AL-TAQIYYE of course!
So don't use their islamic news sources (Zaman, TodaysZaman, Vakit,
YeniSafak, Star, Taraf, ...) as it is mostly propaganda full with lies.
Ask the secular Turkish opposition parties (CHP, DSP, SHP, IP, DTP etc...)
and
news sources (***huriyet, Milliyet, Vatan, Tercüman, Yenicag, Hürriyet,
Ulusal Kanal, ...)
You cannot trust the ruling Islamic AKP party and its leader PM Erdogan!
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