"Reality_Check©" <Reality@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in news:6eqk7lF8f995U1
@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> "Gray Ghost" <grey_ghost471-newsgroups@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
>> David Hartung <d_hartung@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in
>>> Reality_Check© wrote:
>>>> "David Hartung" <d_hartung@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
>>>>> Reality_Check wrote:
>>>>>> "Mike Painter" <mddotpainter@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
>>>>>>> _ Prof. Jonez _ wrote: <snip>
>>>>>>>>> How many Japanese and American lives do you believe would have
been
>>>>>>>>> lost in an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands?
>>>>>>>> Why would you need to invade them?
>>>>>>> The fanitical military had the guns and would have kept the food.
>>>>>>> They would have been the last to die, with the civilian population
>>>>>>> going first. Prove it.
>>>>> Which is the whole point.
>>>>>
>>>>> You are second guessing Truman 60 years after the event having no
idea
>>>>> of the extent of his knowledge at time. In other words, you do not
know
>>>>> the situation.
>>>>
>>>> I do know the U$$A is the ONLY nation to have dropped NUCLEAR Weapons
>>>> of Mass Destruction upon CIVILIAN Population centers -- twice --
killing
>>>> over 100,000+ innocent men, women and children.
>>>
>>> Which means that you know nothing at all.
>>
>> Nobody who espouses those views has the first idea what they are
>> discussing.
>
> "The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all."
> -- U$ Major Gen. Curtis LeMay, September 1945
>
> Do you practice being a lying piece of crap, or does it come naturally
for
> you?
>
>
No I practice stating historical fact. It doesn't trouble me. how about
you?
Exactly where are you from? Your email suggests Italy. Are you just bitter
because your gramps was fooled by Mussolini only to have your country
plowed
under by the Allies. That would explain your bitterness.
Factions in the Imperial Japanese Army wanted to continue to fight
using malnourished civilians with sharpened sticks for the Honor of the
Emperor.
Do you have any idea how close the surrender came to being aborted? Do you
know that the failure of the coup turned on the actions of a single
general?
That his motivation was his loyalty to the Emperor and not his concern for
lives of the Japanese civil population? Do you know his name? I do.
You have not researched this era at all. No rational person who has
studied
the period and understands the cir***stances would say such things.
Operation Downfall was the overall Allied plan for the invasion of Japan
near
the end of World War II. The operation was cancelled when Japan
surrendered
following the atomic bombing of Hiro****ma and Nagasaki, and the Soviet
Union's declaration of war against Japan.
Operation Downfall consisted of two parts — Operation Olympic and
Operation
Coronet. Set to begin in October 1945, Operation Olympic was intended to
capture the southern third of the southernmost main Japanese island of
Kyushu, with the recently captured island of Okinawa to be used as a
staging
area. Later, in the spring of 1946, Operation Coronet was the planned
invasion of the Kanto plain near Tokyo on the Japanese island of Honshu.
Airbases on Kyushu captured in Operation Olympic would allow land-based
air
sup****t for Operation Coronet.
Japan's geography made this invasion plan obvious to the Japanese as well;
they were able to accurately deduce the Allied invasion plans and adjust
their defensive plans accordingly. The Japanese planned an all-out defense
of
Kyushu, with little left in reserve for any subsequent defense operations.
Casualty predictions varied widely but were extremely high for both sides:
depending on the degree to which Japanese civilians resisted the invasion,
estimates ran into the millions for Allied casualties,[1] and tens of
millions for Japanese casualties.
Assumptions
While the geography of Japan was fixed, the U.S. military planners could
only
estimate the defending forces they would face. Based on intelligence
available early in 1945, their assumptions included the following:
"That operations in this area will be opposed not only by the available
organized military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile
population."
"That approximately three (3) hostile divisions will be disposed in
Southern
KYUSHU and an additional three (3) in Northern KYUSHU at initiation of the
OLYMPIC operation."
"That total hostile forces committed against KYUSHU operations will not
exceed eight (8) to ten (10) divisions and that this level will be
speedily
attained."
"That approximately twenty-one (21) hostile divisions, including depot
divisions, will be on HONSHU at initiation of [Coronet] and that fourteen
(14) of these divisions may be employed in the KANTO PLAIN area."
"That the enemy may withdraw his land-based air forces to the Asiatic
Mainland for protection from our neutralizing attacks. That under such
cir***stances he can possibly amass from 2,000 to 2,500 planes in that
area
by exercise of rigid economy, and that this force can operate against
KYUSHU
landings by staging through homeland fields."
Olympic
Operation Olympic was to attack southern Japan.Operation Olympic, the
invasion of Kyushu, was to begin on "X-Day", which was scheduled for
November
1, 1945. The combined Allied naval armada would have been the largest ever
assembled, including forty-two aircraft carriers, twenty-four battle****ps,
and four hundred destroyers and destroyer escorts. Fourteen U.S. divisions
were scheduled to take part in the initial landings. Using Okinawa as a
staging base, the objective would have been to seize the southern ****tion
of
Kyushu. This area would then be used as a further staging point to attack
Honshu in Operation Coronet.
The U.S. Twentieth Air Force was to have continued its role as the main
Allied strategic bomber force used against the Japanese home islands.
Tactical air sup****t was to be the responsibility of the U.S. Far East Air
Forces (FEAF) — a formation which comprised the Fifth, Thirteenth and
Seventh
Air Forces — during the preparation for the invasion. FEAF was responsible
for attacking Japanese airfields and trans****tation arteries on Kyushu and
Southern Honshu (e.g. the Kanmon Tunnel) and for attaining and maintaining
air superiority over the beaches.
Kyushu was to be invaded by U.S. Sixth Army at three points — Miyazaki,
Ariake, and Ku****kino. If a clock were drawn on a map of Kyushu, these
points
would roughly correspond to 4, 5, and 7 o'clock, respectively. The 35
landing
beaches were all named for automobiles: Austin, Buick, Cadillac through
Stutz, Winton, and Zephyr.[10] With one corps assigned to each landing,
the
invasion planners assumed that the Americans would outnumber the Japanese
by
roughly three to one. In early 1945 Miyazaki was virtually undefended,
while
Ariake with its nearby good harbor was heavily defended. Although
Ku****kino
was weakly defended, its imposing terrain meant that the Marines who
landed
there would probably have had the toughest time.
Coronet
Operation Coronet, the invasion of Honshu at the Kanto Plain south of the
capital, was to begin on "Y-Day", which was scheduled for March 1, 1946.
Coronet would have been the largest amphibious operation of all time, with
25
divisions (including the floating reserve) earmarked for the initial
operations. U.S. First Army would have invaded at Kujukuri Beach, on the
Boso
Peninsula, while U.S. Eighth Army invaded at Hiratsuka, on Sagami Bay.
Both
armies would then drive north and inland, meeting at Tokyo.
Operation Ketsugo
Meanwhile, the Japanese had their own plans. Initially, they were
concerned
about an invasion during the summer of 1945. However, the Battle of
Okinawa
went on so long that they concluded the Allies would not be able to launch
another operation before the typhoon season, during which the weather
would
be too risky for amphibious operations. Japanese intelligence predicted
fairly closely where the invasion would take place: southern Kyushu at
Miyazaki, Ariake Bay, and/or the Satsuma Peninsula.[16]
While Japan no longer had a realistic prospect of winning the war, it
could
perhaps raise the cost of conquering Japan too high for the Allies to
accept,
leading to some sort of armistice. The Japanese plan for defeating the
invasion was called Operation Ketsugo (????, ketsugo sakusen?) ("Operation
Codename Decision").
Kamikaze
Admiral Matome Ugaki was recalled to Japan in February 1945 and given
command
of the Fifth Air Fleet on Kyushu. The Fifth Air Fleet was assigned the
task
of kamikaze attacks against ****ps involved in the invasion of Okinawa,
Operation Ten-Go and began training pilots and assembling aircraft for the
defense of Kyushu where the Allies were likely to invade next.
The Japanese defense relied heavily on kamikaze planes. In addition to
fighters and bombers, they reassigned almost all of their trainers for the
mission, trying to make up in quantity what they lacked in quality. Their
army and navy had more than 10,000 aircraft ready for use in July (and
would
have had somewhat more by October) and were planning to use almost all
that
could reach the invasion fleets. Ugaki also oversaw building of hundreds
of
small suicide boats that would also be used to attack any Allied ****ps
that
came near the shores of Kyushu.
Fewer than 2,000 kamikaze planes launched attacks during the Battle of
Okinawa, achieving approximately one hit per nine attacks. At Kyushu,
given
the more favorable cir***stances, they hoped to get one for six by
overwhelming the U.S. defenses with large numbers of kamikaze attacks in a
period of hours. The Japanese estimated that the planes would sink more
than
400 ****ps; since they were training the pilots to target trans****ts rather
than carriers and destroyers, the casualties would be dispro****tionately
greater than at Okinawa. One staff study estimated that the kamikazes
could
destroy a third to a half of the invasion force before its landings.[17]
Naval forces
By August 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had ceased to be an
effective fighting force. The only Japanese major war****ps in fighting
order
were six aircraft carriers, four cruisers, and one battle****p, none of
which
could be adequately fueled. The navy still had quite a large number of
minor
war****ps, but their use would also be limited by the lack of fuel. They
could
"sustain a force of twenty operational destroyers and perhaps forty
submarines for a few days at sea."[18]
The IJN also had about 100 Koryu-class midget submarines, 250 smaller
Kairyu-
class midget submarines, 1,000 Kaiten manned torpedoes, and 800 ****n'yo
suicide boats.
Ground forces
In any amphibious operation, the defender has two options for defensive
strategy — strong defense of the beaches, or defense in depth. Early in
the
war (such as at Tarawa) the Japanese employed strong defenses on the
beaches
with little or no manpower in reserve. This tactic proved to be very
vulnerable to pre-invasion shore bombardment. Later in the war, at
Peleliu,
Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, the Japanese switched strategy and dug in their
forces
in the most defensible terrain. Fighting evolved into long battles of
attrition, with very high American casualties, but no hope of victory for
the
Japanese.
For the defense of Kyushu, the Japanese took an intermediate posture, with
the bulk of their defensive forces a few kilometres inland from the shore
—
back far enough to avoid complete exposure to naval gunnery, but close
enough
that the Americans could not establish a secure foothold before engaging
them. The counteroffensive forces were still further back, prepared to
move
against whichever landing seemed to be the main effort.
In March 1945, there was only one combat division in Kyushu. Over the next
four months the Japanese Army transferred forces from Manchuria, Korea,
and
northern Japan, while raising other forces in place. By August, they had
fourteen divisions and various smaller formations, including three tank
brigades, for a total of 900,000 men.[19] Although the Japanese were able
to
raise large numbers of new soldiers, equipping them was more difficult. By
August, the Japanese Army had the equivalent of 65 divisions in the
homeland
but only enough equipment for 40 and only enough ammunition for 30.[20]
The Japanese did not formally decide to stake everything on the outcome of
the Battle of Kyushu, but they concentrated their assets to such a degree
that there would be little left in reserve. By one estimate, the forces in
Kyushu had 40% of all the ammunition in the Home Islands.[21]
=======================================================================
In addition, the Japanese had organized the Patriotic Citizens Fighting
Corps
— which included all healthy men aged 15–60 and women 17–40 — to perform
combat sup****t, and ultimately combat jobs. Weapons, training, and
uniforms
were generally lacking: some men were armed with nothing better than
muzzle-
loading muskets, longbows, or bamboo spears; nevertheless, they were
expected
to make do with what they had.[22]
One mobilized high school girl, Yukiko Kasai, found herself issued an awl
and
told, "Even killing one American soldier will do. … You must aim for the
abdomen."[23]
=======================================================================
Allied reevaluation of Olympic
Air threat
U.S. military intelligence initially estimated the number of Japanese
aircraft to be around 2,500.[24] The Okinawa experience was bad — almost
two
fatalities and a similar number wounded per sortie — and Kyushu was likely
to
be worse. To attack the ****ps off Okinawa, planes had to fly long
distances
over open water; to attack the ****ps off Kyushu, they could fly overland
and
then short distances out to the landing fleets. Gradually, intelligence
learned that the Japanese were devoting all their aircraft to the kamikaze
mission and taking effective measures to conserve them until the battle.
An
Army estimate in May was 3,391 planes; in June, 4,862; in August, 5,911. A
Navy estimate, abandoning any distinction between training and combat
aircraft, in July was 8,750; in August, 10,290.[25]
The Allies made counter-Kamikaze preparations, known as the Big Blue
Blanket.
This involved adding more fighter squadrons to the carriers in place of
torpedo- and dive-bombers, and converting B-17s into airborne radar
pickets —
the ancestors of the AWACS. Nimitz came up with a plan for a pre-invasion
feint, sending a fleet to the invasion beaches a couple of weeks before
the
real invasion, to lure out the Japanese on their one-way flights, who
would
then find — instead of the valuable, vulnerable trans****ts — ****ps loaded
with anti-aircraft guns from stem to stern.
The main defense against Japanese air attacks would have come from the
massive fighter forces that were being assembled in the Ryukyu Islands.
U.S.
Army Fifth and Seventh Air Force and U.S. Marine air units had moved into
the
islands immediately after the invasion, and air strength had been
increasing
in preparation for the all-out assault on Japan. In preparation for the
invasion, an air campaign against Japanese airfields and trans****tation
arteries had commenced before the Japanese surrender.
Ground threat
Through April, May, and June, Allied intelligence followed the buildup of
Japanese ground forces, including five divisions added to Kyushu, with
great
interest but some complacency, still projecting that in November the total
for Kyushu would be about 350,000 servicemen. That changed in July, with
the
discovery of four new divisions and indications of more to come. By
August,
the count was up to 600,000, and Magic cryptanalysis had identified nine
divisions in southern Kyushu — three times the expected number: in fact,
this
was still a serious underestimate of Japanese strength; see above.
Estimated
troop strength in early July was 350,000,[26] rising to 545,000 in early
August.
The intelligence revelations about Japanese preparations on Kyushu
emerging
in mid-July transmitted powerful shock waves both in the Pacific and in
Wa****ngton. On 29 July, [MacArthur's intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Charles
A.] Willoughby … noted first that the April estimate allowed for the
Japanese
capability to deploy six divisions on Kyushu, with the potential to deploy
ten. "These [six] divisions have since made their appearance, as
predicted,"
he observed, "and the end is not in sight." If not checked, this
threatened
"to grow to [the] point where we attack on a ratio of one (1) to one (1)
which is not the recipe for victory."[28]
The buildup of Japanese troops on Kyushu led American war planners, most
im****tantly General George Marshall, to consider drastic changes to
Olympic,
or replacing it with a different plan for invasion.
Nuclear weapons
On Marshall's orders, Major-General John E. Hull looked into the tactical
use
of nuclear weapons for the invasion of the Japanese home islands (even
after
dropping two strategic atomic bombs on Japan, Marshall did not think that
the
Japanese would capitulate immediately). Colonel Lyle E. Seeman re****ted
that
at least seven bombs would be available by X-Day, which could be dropped
on
defending forces. Seeman advised that American troops not enter an area
hit
by a bomb for "at least 48 hours"; the risk of fallout was not well
understood, and that short amount of time would have resulted in
substantial
radiation exposure for the American troops.[31]
[edit] Prospects for Olympic
General Douglas MacArthur dismissed any need to change his plans. "I am
certain that the Japanese air potential re****ted to you as ac***ulating to
counter our OLYMPIC operation is greatly exaggerated. … As to the movement
of
ground forces… I do not credit… the heavy strengths re****ted to you in
southern Kyushu. … In my opinion, there should not be the slightest
thought
of changing the OLYMPIC operation."[33] However Admiral Ernest King, the
CNO,
was prepared to officially oppose proceeding with the invasion, with
Admiral
Nimitz's concurrence, which would have set off a major dispute within the
United States government.
At this juncture, the key interaction would likely have been between
Marshall
and Truman. There is strong evidence that Marshall remained committed to
an
invasion as late as 15 August. … But tempering Marshall's personal
commitment
to invasion would have been his comprehension that civilian sanction in
general, and Truman's in particular, was unlikely for a costly invasion
that
no longer enjoyed consensus sup****t from the armed services.[34]
Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Soviets were preparing to follow up
their
invasions of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands with an invasion of the weakly
defended island of Hokkaido by the end of August, which would have put
pressure on the Allies to do something sooner than November. On August 15,
the Japanese agreed to surrender, rendering the whole question of invasion
moot.
[edit] Estimated casualties
Because the U.S. military planners assumed "that operations in this area
will
be opposed not only by the available organized military forces of the
Empire,
but also by a fanatically hostile population",[7] high casualties were
thought to be inevitable, but nobody knew with certainty how high. Several
people made estimates, but they varied widely in numbers, assumptions, and
purposes — which included advocating for and against the invasion —
afterwards, they were reused to debate over the atomic bombings of
Hiro****ma
and Nagasaki.
Casualty estimates were based on the experience of the preceding
campaigns,
drawing different lessons:
In a study done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April, the figures of 7.45
casualties/1,000 man-days and 1.78 fatalities/1,000 man-days were
developed.
This implied that a 90-day Olympic campaign would cost 456,000 casualties,
including 109,000 dead or missing. If Coronet took another 90 days, the
combined cost would be 1,200,000 casualties, with 267,000 fatalities.[36]
A study done by Adm. Nimitz's staff in May estimated 49,000 casualties in
the
first 30 days, including 5,000 at sea.[37] A study done by General
MacArthur's staff in June estimated 23,000 in the first 30 days and
125,000
after 120 days.[38] When these figures were questioned by General
Marshall,
MacArthur submitted a revised estimate of 105,000, in part by deducting
wounded men able to return to duty.[39]
In a conference with President Truman on June 18, Marshall, taking the
Battle
of Luzon as the best model for Olympic, thought the Americans would suffer
31,000 casualties in the first 30 days (and ultimately 20% of Japanese
casualties, which implied a total of 70,000 casualties).[40] Adm. Leahy,
more
impressed by the Battle of Okinawa, thought the American forces would
suffer
a 35% casualty rate (implying an ultimate toll of 268,000).[41] Admiral
King
thought that casualties in the first 30 days would fall between Luzon and
Okinawa, i.e., between 31,000 and 41,000.[42]
Of these estimates, only Nimitz's included losses of the forces at sea,
though kamikazes had inflicted 1.78 fatalities per kamikaze pilot in the
Battle of Okinawa,[43] and troop trans****ts off Kyushu would have been
much
more exposed.
A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff by William
Shockley
estimated that conquering Japan would cost 1.7 to 4 million American
casualties, including 400,000 to 800,000 fatalities, and five to ten
million
Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by
civilians in the defense of Japan.[1]
Outside the government, well-informed civilians were also making guesses.
Kyle Palmer, war correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, said half a
million
to a million Americans would die by the end of the war. Herbert Hoover, in
memorandums submitted to Truman and Stimson, also estimated 500,000 to
1,000,000 fatalities, and were believed to be conservative estimates; but
it
is not known if Hoover discussed these specific figures in his meetings
with
Truman. The chief of the Army Operations division thought them "entirely
too
high" under "our present plan of campaign."[44]
For context, the Battle of Normandy had cost 63,000 casualties in the
first
48 days; and the Battle of Okinawa ran up 72,000 casualties over about 82
days, of whom 18,900 were killed or missing. Several thousand soldiers who
died indirectly whether from wounds or other causes at a later date are
not
included. The entire war cost the United States a total of just over a
million casualties, with 400,000 fatalities.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Nearly 500,000 Purple Heart medals were manufactured in anticipation of
the
casualties resulting from the invasion of Japan. To the present date, all
the
American military casualties of the sixty years following the end of World
War II — including the Korean and Vietnam Wars — have not exceeded that
number. In 2003, there were still 120,000 of these Purple Heart medals in
stock.[45] There are so many in surplus that combat units in Iraq and
Afghanistan are able to keep Purple Hearts on-hand for immediate award to
wounded soldiers on the field.[45]
*******************************************************************
I am inclined to beleive those who were there at the time facing extremely
difficult choices that were going to affect the lives of millions of
people
as opposed to the venomous pulp of a 63 year after the fact bozo with
supposed 20/20 hindsight. Which in this case means you are looking up your
ass.
Frank
--
Title 18 > Chapter 115 > § 2381 Treason
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or
adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United
States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall
be
imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not
less
than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the
United
States
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