source: http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=2058
The recent events in Beirut pose a simple, fundamental question: Who
rules in Lebanon.
The answer proposed by Hizbullah last week is that the government of
Fuad Saniora and Saad Hariri is to be permitted to hold the formal
reins of administration - on condition that they well understand the
inherent limits of their position. Most im****tant, any attempt to
interfere with the Iranian-created and Iranian- and Syrian-sponsored
military infrastructure in the country will result in a swift,
dispro****tionate and bloody response.
Hizbullah and its backers have made clear that if the choice is
between civil war and accepting limitations on the autonomy of their
military infrastructure, they will choose the former. At the same
time, their actions in Beirut last week made clear that as long as
this point is accepted by the March 14 government, they will permit a
return to the former stalemate.
Recall the sequence of events: Lebanon has been locked in a standoff
between the pro-US March 14 Movement and the pro-Iran and pro-Syria
opposition ever since the latter launched a campaign to achieve veto
power over government decisions, in the months following the war of
2006.
The Saniora government refused to bow to the opposition's demands. The
result has been ongoing political tension punctuated by periodic flare-
ups, such as that of January 2007, which have brought the country to
the brink of civil war.
The latest tension emerged from a Hizbullah-sponsored series of labor
union protests.
But the key event precipitating Hizbullah's military takeover of West
Beirut was the decision by the government to act against Hizbullah's
independent military infrastructure through two bold moves: First, the
government sought to dismiss the security chief at Rafik Hariri
International Air****t, Wafiq Choukair, who is known to be close to
Hizbullah.
This move came after prominent March 14 leader and Druse strongman
Walid Jumblatt revealed that Hizbullah had installed surveillance
cameras at the air****t's Runway 17. The runway overlooks the hangars
containing private jets, an air force base, and the VIP visitors
building. Jumblatt further argued that Iranian flights to Beirut
should be stopped, as they could be carrying equipment for Hizbullah,
and called for the Iranian ambassador to be expelled.
In a second, related move, the government launched a judicial
investigation into the Iranian-built independent telecommunications
network maintained by Hizbullah. This network is thought to extend
from Beirut across the south of the country, and into the Bekaa.
For Hizbullah, these actions by the government clearly trespassed
beyond a red line: namely, the tacit acceptance by the Saniora
government that the means by which Hizbullah and its backers conduct
their activities in Lebanon are off-limits to the organs of the
Lebanese state.
The response was swift and furious. Hizbullah gunmen poured onto the
streets of West Beirut and engaged the untrained pro-government Sunnis
who sought to oppose them. Eleven people were killed and 30 were
wounded in the subsequent fighting, which ended with the surrender or
flight of the pro-government elements.
Hizbullah simultaneously carried out a series of acts designed to
humiliate the government and to demonstrate its ineffectiveness.
Hizbullah men blocked the roads to and from the air****t, cutting
Lebanon off from the outside world, forced the pro-government Al-
Mustaqbal TV station and other pro-government news outlets off the
air, and burned the offices of the Al-Mustaqbal newspaper. The
headquarters of Saniora and Saad Hariri was besieged. Following this
demonstration of strength, Hizbullah expressed its willingness to hand
all captured areas over to the Lebanese army.
The message was clear. The events of the past days are an attempt by
the pro-Iranian regional alliance to guard the perimeters of its main
asset in Lebanon - namely, the well financed and trained Hizbullah
military infrastructure. Iran wishes to maintain this structure, but
not to seize formal power in Lebanon. Rather, it is an instrument to
be activated against Israel, at the appropriate moment. In the
meantime, Teheran and Hizbullah are content to leave the Saniora
government to continue the administration of Lebanon's internal
affairs, on condition it understands its limits.
The first question now is whether the Saniora government is prepared
to accept this situation. (The original dispute over the dismissal of
Choukair and the closing of the telecommunications network remains
unresolved.) The second question is whether, if it is not, March 14
possesses the will and the tools to mount an effective opposition to
the Hizbullah state within a state.
Hizbullah's latest action brings the movement closer to openly pitting
Lebanon's ****'ites against its Druse, Christian and Sunni communities.
The opposition's Christian component - the Free Patriotic Movement of
Gen. Michel Aoun - appears largely an irrelevance in the developing
dynamic. Instead, the allies that matter to Hizbullah now are the
****'ite Amal movement and the small pro-Syrian and Palestinian
militias that have mobilized to sup****t the opposition in the past
days.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia have expressed sup****t for the Saniora
government. The Sunni mufti of Lebanon has harshly condemned
Hizbullah's actions. But it appears that Hizbullah feels strong enough
to contemplate such a situation, and to dismiss the possibility of the
coalition of communities backing the government mounting an effective
response. The coming weeks will show if Hizbullah's confidence in this
regard was misplaced.
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