How Prime Minister Maliki Pacified Iraq
By KIMBERLY KAGAN and FREDERICK W. KAGAN
June 10, 2008
America is very close to succeeding in Iraq. The "near-strategic defeat"
of al Qaeda in Iraq described by CIA Director Michael Hayden last month
in the Wa****ngton Post has been followed by the victory of the Iraqi
government's security forces over illegal ****ite militias, including
Iranian-backed Special Groups. The enemies of Iraq and America now cling
desperately to their last bastions, while the political process builds
momentum.
These tremendous gains remain fragile and could be lost to skillful enemy
action, or errors in Baghdad or Wa****ngton. But where the U.S. was
unequivocally losing in Iraq at the end of 2006, we are just as
unequivocally winning today.
By February 2008, America and its partners accomplished a series of tasks
thought to be impossible. The Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda in Iraq
were defeated in Anbar, Diyala and Baghdad provinces, and the remaining
leaders and fighters clung to their last urban outpost in Mosul. The
Iraqi government passed all but one of the "benchmark" laws (the
hydrocarbon law being the exception, but its purpose is now largely
accomplished through the budget) and was integrating grass-roots
reconciliation with central political progress. The sectarian civil war
had ended.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), swelled by 100,000 new
recruits in 2007, was fighting hard and skillfully throughout Iraq. The
****ite-led government was showing an increasing willingness to use its
forces even against ****ite militias. The announcement that provincial
elections would be held by year's end galvanized political movements
across the country, focusing Iraq's leaders on the need to get more votes
rather than more guns.
Three main challenges to security and political progress remained:
clearing al Qaeda out of Mosul; bringing Basra under the Iraqi
government's control; and eliminating the Special Groups safe havens in
Sadr City. It seemed then that these tasks would require enormous effort,
entail great loss of life, and take the rest of the year or more.
Instead, the Iraqi government accomplished them within a few months.
- Mosul: After losing in central Iraq, remnants of al Qaeda and Baathist
insurgents were driven north. These groups started to reconstitute in
Mosul as the last large urban area open to them. Mosul also contained
financial networks that had funded the insurgency, was a waypoint for
foreign fighters infiltrating from Syria, and has ethno-sectarian fault
lines that al Qaeda sought to exploit.
The Iraqi government responded by forming the Ninewah Operations Command
early in 2008, concentrating forces around Mosul, and preparing for a
major clearing operation. In February, the ISF cleared the neighborhoods
of Palestine and Sumer, two key al Qaeda safe havens.
In the meantime, American forces conducted numerous raids against the
terrorist network, netting hundreds of key individuals. The ISF launched
Operation Lion's Roar on May 10. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited
Mosul on May 14, and the ISF began Operation Mother of Two Springs
shortly thereafter.
The results have been dramatic. Enemy attacks fell from an average of 40
per day in the first week of May to between four and six per day in the
following two weeks. Coalition forces have captured or killed the al-
Qaeda emirs of Mosul, Southeast Mosul, Ninewah Province and much of their
networks.
Mr. Maliki announced a $100 million reconstruction package for Mosul on
May 17 and dispatched an envoy on May 29 to oversee the distribution of
funds. Security progress was made possible in part by the enrollment of
1,000 former members of the Iraqi Army. They were part of the revision of
the de-Baathification policy legislated by the Iraqi Parliament earlier
in the year.
- Basra: Al Qaeda's defeat in 2007 exposed Iranian-backed Special Groups
and ****ite militias as the most im****tant sources of violence and
casualties. The Maliki government had shown its willingness to target
Sunni insurgents, but many feared it would not challenge Iran's proxies
and the Sadrist militias within which they functioned. Basra, in
particular, seemed an almost insurmountable problem following the
withdrawal of British combat forces from the city. This left Iraq's
second-largest city (and only ****t) in the hands of rival militias.
Iraqi and American commanders began planning for a gradual effort to
retake the city. Mr. Maliki decided not to wait. He ordered clearing
operations to begin on March 22, sent reinforcements to sup****t those
operations, and accompanied the first of those reinforcements to Basra on
March 24.
Operation Knight's Charge started on March 25, as Iraqi Security Forces
moved into Mahdi Army (JAM) safe havens throughout the city. Initial
operations were not promising – some 1,000 ISF personnel deserted or
refused to fight, most of them from the newly formed 14th Iraqi Army
Division. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Army seized control of the ****t.
Initial setbacks did not deter Mr. Maliki, who continued to send in
reinforcements, including Iraqi Special Forces, Iraqi helicopters and the
Quick Reaction Force of the 1st Iraqi Army Division from Anbar.
Negotiations between Iraqi leaders and Iranian Brig. Gen. Ghassem
Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force, produced a "cease-fire"
on March 30.
But operations continued, and after two weeks the ISF, with American
advisers and aviation but no American combat units, launched clearing
operations throughout the city on April 12. By mid-May, the ISF
controlled Basra's neighborhoods, and drove JAM and Special Groups
fighters out of their safe havens, pursuing them north and south of the
city.
Mr. Maliki had authorized the recruitment of 2,500 local security
volunteers and begun negotiating with their tribal leaders for their
incor****ation into the ISF. The establishment of Iraqi government control
in Basra was symbolized by the recapture of state buildings and open
areas that had been occupied by various Sadrist and other insurgent
groups, and by the seizure of enormous weapons caches.
- Sadr City: The Special Groups had been preparing for an offensive of
their own in the first months of 2008, stockpiling arms and moving
trained fighters into and around the country. Mr. Maliki's move into
Basra led them to begin their offensive prematurely, including the
launching of heavy rocket and mortar attacks against the Green Zone from
their bases in Sadr City. Iraqi Security Forces crushed these attacks in
central Iraq and, with American assistance, in most of Baghdad.
The rocketing of the Green Zone, however, convinced American and Iraqi
leaders to cordon off Sadr City, and to clear the two southernmost
neighborhoods from which most of the rockets were coming. The government
and U.S. commanders moved reinforcements toward Sadr City and began
planning for a clearing operation. In the meantime, Iraqi officials began
negotiating with Sadr City leaders, as U.S. forces erected a wall to
separate the cleared neighborhoods from the rest of Sadr City.
On May 20, the ISF, sup****ted by U.S. airpower and advisers, moved
rapidly into the remainder of Sadr City. They received help from the
local population in identifying IED locations and enemy safe houses, and
destroyed enemy leader****p centers. By the end of May, most of the
Special Groups and hard-core Sadrist fighters had been killed, captured
or driven off.
At present, al Qaeda is left with a tenuous foothold in Ninewah and a
scattered presence throughout the rest of Sunni Iraq. Special Groups
leaders who survived have mostly fled to Iran, while hard-core Sadrist
fighters have fallen back to Maysan Province, whose capital, Amarah, has
become their last urban sanctuary. All of Iraq's other major population
centers are controlled by the ISF, which can now move freely throughout
the country as never before.
The war is not over. Enemy groups are reforming, rearming and preparing
new attacks. Al Qaeda in Iraq will conduct spectacular attacks in 2008
wherever it can. Special Groups and their JAM affiliates will probably
reconstitute within a few months and launch new offensives timed to
influence both the American and Iraqi elections in the fall.
And for all its progress and success, the ISF is not yet able to stand on
its own. Coalition forces continue to play key sup****t roles, maintaining
stability and security in cleared but threatened areas, and serving as
impartial and honest brokers between Iraqi groups working toward
reconciliation.
But success is in sight. Compared with the seemingly insurmountable
obstacles already overcome, the remaining challenges in Iraq are
eminently solvable – if we continue to pursue a determined strategy that
builds on success rather than throwing our accomplishments away. No one
in December 2006 could have imagined how far we would have come in 18
months. Having come this far, we must see this critical effort through to
the end.
Ms. Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War in
Wa****ngton, D.C., and author of "The Surge: A Military History,"
forthcoming from Encounter Books. Mr. Kagan is a resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute.
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