The Mistakes That Launched 3,000 Rockets

When Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon withdrew 8,000 residents and
all of its defense forces from the Gaza Strip in the late summer of
2005, he offered several rationales to sup****t what he called
"disengagement."  Regrettably, all but one have proven to be
illusory.  The result has been disastrous -- leading to the creation
of a lawless terrorist haven in the Gaza Strip from which the
controlling Hamas faction has lobbed thousands of crude rockets
indiscriminately into southern Israel, precipitating a new generation
of terror attacks against the Jewish state.

Demographics

One argument cited was the need to take the teeming Gaza Strip out of
the Israeli-Palestinian demographic equation.   It was estimated that
some 1.5 million Palestinians live in Gaza, 2.5 million Palestinians
live in the West Bank, and one million Arabs lives inside Israel's
green line.  This population of 5 million Arabs roughly matched
Israel's Jewish population of 5 million.  Thus, Sharon reasoned, with
just the West Bank under Israeli control, the concern that Israeli
Jews would soon be a minority between the Mediterranean Sea and the
Jordan River appeared less foreboding, or at least not for several
decades.

As it turns out, the demographic scenarios promulgated by those who
advocated for an Israeli withdrawal from both Gaza and the West Bank
were wildly off the mark. As noted by researchers Bennett Zimmerman
and Michael Wise in the pages of inFocus Quarterly, the Palestinian
census counters inflated the Palestinian population in the West Bank
and Gaza, while also exaggerating the annual population growth rate
for the Palestinians.

In retrospect, the Gaza withdrawal may have lifted the Jewish
percentage in the remaining areas under Israeli control, but the move
was premature if not completely unnecessary.

Preventing Terror

A second rationale was that if Israeli settlers were removed from
Gaza, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) would have no civilian population
to protect, thereby relieving the army of the need to remain. Gaza,
after all, had never been a major source of the suicide bombing
attacks that had occurred inside Israel's green line. In fact,
throughout the "al-Aqsa intifada" that began in 2000, only one such
attack originated in Gaza, when foreign nationals traveling to Israel
from Gaza with British pass****ts devastated Mike's Bar, a popular pub
near the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv in 2003. The IDF had simply erected
a fence to surround Gaza, preventing untold numbers of suicide
attacks.

In the years since its 2005 withdrawal, the IDF has learned a
difficult lesson: suicide bombing is not the only way for terrorist to
inflict harm upon Israeli civilians. Indeed, a fence cannot prevent
projectiles such as rockets, missiles, or mortars aimed at close-by
Israeli communities.

These attacks began soon after the Gaza fence was completed in 2001,
but increased substantially year after year.   Over the last seven
years, Palestinian rockets have become increasingly lethal, with
longer trajectories.  Conservative estimates suggest that 3,000
rockets have been fired into Israel, not to mention mortars and
missiles.  The rockets now reach Ashkelon, a city of over 100,000
people, with key infrastructure, including a major Israeli ****t.


It is unclear whether Israel assumed that the Palestinian Authority
would want to keep a lid on rocket fire from Gaza, since a period of
"quiet" might encourage further Israeli withdrawals from the West
Bank. If this ever was the case, things certainly changed in June
2007, when Hamas' one week military coup decimated the PA's grip on
power in Gaza.  Since then, rockets have been landing at an
increasingly rapid rate.

Public Relations

A third rationale for Gaza disengagement was that Israel, often
maligned in the mainstream media, would win a public relations victory
from its unilateral withdrawal.  This was wishful thinking.  While the
media has occasionally heaped scorn upon Hamas for its indiscriminate
rocket attacks, the disengagement has done little to improve Israel's
steady drubbing when it defends itself.


Sadly, the occasional criticism of Hamas violence seems to suggest
that indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilian targets were somehow
more justified during the period when Israel controlled Gaza.
Meanwhile, Israel is still castigated by the United Nations, left-
leaning Human Rights groups and NGOs, and, of course, the Arab League
and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.  These groups can no
longer castigate Israel for occupying the Gaza Strip so they now level
new charges of collective punishment against Palestinian civilians in
Gaza, when Israel responds with military operations in the areas where
the rockets are launched.

A Gesture For Peace

A fourth rationale for the Gaza withdrawal was that it would lead to
an improved atmosphere between Israel and the PA, and perhaps ****ge
both parties towards negotiating peace. The Olmert and Abbas
governments are now busy negotiating a "shelf" agreement, but it is
one in which even the most ardent peace pundits have little to no
faith.

There are currently two Palestinian entities: Hamastan in Gaza, and
the PA under Mahmoud Abbas, which maintains only tenuous control in
the West Bank.  If not for a steady IDF presence, analysts believe
Hamas could easily take over. The PA is negotiating with Israel as if
it controls Gaza , and Israel plays along.  Only, Hamas is as much at
war with the PA, as they are with Israel.

Let Gazans Control Their Destiny

The final rationale for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 may
prove to be the only one with validity.  Optimists viewed Palestinian
"sovereignty" in Gaza as a way for the Palestinians to demonstrate
that, once in control of their own destiny, Gazans could take
responsibility for their quality of life and their economic
condition.

At least in one way, this has been a successful experiment. Hamas has
demonstrated ingenuity in two areas: construction of smuggling tunnels
under the border crossing between Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Gaza,
and mass-producing rockets with more precise targeting ability,
greater firing range, and more destructive capability.  While both
endeavors have increased Hamas' ability to strike at Israeli
civilians, they have done little to help the Palestinian national
cause. By their own admission, Gazans are awash in misery and poverty.

Before its landslide electoral victory in 2006, Hamas was described by
na=EFve observers as the one Palestinian group free of corruption.
Compared to the ossified and corrupt Fatah party, Hamas could claim
that it was the good government party, particularly since it had been
providing social services to Palestinians through its da'wa (outreach)
system for years.

Since the election Hamas has proven that feeding the hungry, clothing
the poor, and providing medicines to the sick are among its lowest
priorities. Rather, Hamas has focused all of its resources on
attacking Israel - and even Fatah.

Lessons Learned

There are two painful lessons that can be learned from the daily
rocket fire on Sd*****, Ashkelon, and other population centers in
Israel's south.  First, Israeli gestures of good will signal weakness,
and can lead to greater Palestinian hostility and violence.  Second,
half measures never solve any underlying problems.

Indeed, every one of the rationales for the 2005 disengagement
envisioned a quiet border, and an improved security situation.
Hopefully, the Israelis have learned two more lessons from the Gaza
situation:  know your enemy, and no more wishful thinking.
http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/06/the_mistakes_that_launched_300.html